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Building Something New out of Something Old: 
The Russia of Today 
“Hundreds of people, including a prominent opposition figure, were arrested in 
Moscow Sunday [March 26th, 2017] for participating in unauthorized protests, 
according to state media and a human rights group. Russian human rights group 
OVD-Info tweeted that more than 700 had been detained in Moscow -- while 
state-run news agency Ria Novosti said 500 had been held.”1 
 Russia has never been a country known for its appreciation of the voices of its 
average citizens. Changes to this have slowly occurred over the country’s history though, 
starting in 1861 when the serfs, the peasants who made up the lower class of tsarist 
Russia and were by far the majority, were emancipated from their landowners in 
contracts that can be considered a type of slavery.2 Just a little more than 50 years later 
the Bolshevik revolution occurs, a worker’s revolution, a class revolution that was for the 
salt of the Earth. Unfortunately, this did not fully occur in the Soviet times, a hierarchy of 
power was still implemented, and corruption became widespread by the time the Soviet 
Union dissolved. This continued over into the 90s, and with it a feeling of helplessness in 
the people of Russia. No governmental assistance had been established with everyone 
fighting for their own wellbeing. Then on New Year’s Eve of the new millennium, 
                                                 
1 Mortensen, Antonia, Fred Pleitgen, Matt Rehbein, and Ryan Prior. "Report: Hundreds Arrested at 
Anti-corruption Protests in Russia." CNN. Cable News Network, 27 Mar. 2017. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
2 Lynch, Michael. "The Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, 1861: A Charter of Freedom or an Act of 
Betrayal?" The Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, 1861: A Charter of Freedom or an Act of Betrayal? 




Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin announces that he will become the next president of the 
Russian Federation.  
 Putin made promises to bring back a government that the citizens of Russia can 
depend on and can expect to take charge and represent the country of Russia as a strong 
presence. In his New Year’s Eve essay Putin has stated that an “important lesson of the 
1990s is that Russia needs to form a system for the state to regulate the economy and 
social sphere.”3 Control during the 90s was completely monopolized by oligarchs who 
used their money to influence politicians all the way up to Boris Yeltsin himself. Private 
practice had invaded the political realm and taken it over. Putin’s reaction to this has been 
for there to be a strong State structure that utilizes all the tools at its disposal to secure 
control over a potential threat. This utilization has given birth to a centralized control 
scheme with Putin on the top. He has continued centralization processes sixteen years 
into his administrations regime, in “April [of 2016] with the creation of the National 
Guard, a new body that oversees Interior Ministry troops, OMON riot police, and SOBR 
special forces. The Federal Migration Service (FMS) and Federal Drug Control Service 
(FSKN) were also folded into the Interior Ministry at the time.”4 But with the rise of a 
strong centralized government is the emergence of authoritarian practices. Putin is 
sacrificing the comfort of the individual for the security of the citizens, but there has been 
evidence that his promises are not entirely correct.  
 The implementation of human rights in Russia would greatly improve the 
wellbeing of the country as a whole through breaking down the centralization of power, 
                                                 
3 Putin, Vladimir. "Vladimir Putin's First Paper as President: 'Russia at the Turn of the Millennium' - A 
Strategy for Russia's Revival." Sott.net. Quantum Future Group, 31 Dec. 1999. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
4 Kaylan, Melik. "Putin Brings Back The KGB As Russia Moves From Authoritarian To Totalitarian." 




resulting in the population having more say in the country’s future. Putin has done all that 
he can to deny this to happen, continually utilizing a rhetoric of populism the is derived 
from Russian nationalism to reject human rights as Western. He has emphasized that due 
to the false claim that human rights are Western they have no purpose being in Russia 
because their presence is one that would destroy Russia from the inside out. The result, in 
Putin’s words, would be that Russia would just become any other Western country in its 
cultural significance. Coincidentally Putin would be able more easily keep his 
concentrated level of power if human rights were not in the minds of Russian citizens. 
But Russian’s need to realize that human rights is something more than just Western 
interpretations, they are about the rights of the individual regardless of the nationalistic 
background. Human rights can be representative in any type of communal culture, 
including Russia.  
 This paper is broken down into three chapters, each one focusing on how the 
Russian identity of the 21st century has been utilized to develop a relationship with 
human rights. The first chapter is about the Russian identity that Putin is motivating the 
citizens to embody. This citizen is one that exists in the confines of the populist support, 
one that not only prides themselves in believing in the government, but one that 
exclusively relies on the support of this government. This type of belief system 
encourages the dismissal of human rights as being something that legitimizes the West’s 
control of the international rule of law. The second chapter focuses on how Putin’s 
administration deals with human rights organizations and laws that are from the West. In 
this chapter, there is the explanation to how Putin defines and differs his Russia from a 




that Putin has created in the first chapter reacts towards conventional human right related 
topics as we know them here in the West, such as Amnesty International or an unbiased 
court case. The third chapter shows how human rights have been properly utilized by 
Russians as being Russian in design. These movements are also shown to be Russian in 
their goals, which focus on demographics that Putin’s Russia supports, such as soldiers 
and families. Even though Putin has utilized all he can do as the head of a centralized 
government to stop a belief in human rights as able to be Russian, the citizens have the 
ability to see the positive influence, even with Putin’s absorbent amount of propaganda 
against anything anti-Putin.  
 This paper is about how nationalism and authoritarianism in the 21st century is not 
always the same stereotype as they were in the 20th century, when tyranny had to be 
destroyed by an outsider force to restructure the entire government, such as the Nazis. 
Even with the power that Putin has gathered over seventeen years in power, protest 
movements are still happening that are declaring that regardless of what the political 
machinations of Russia are stating, there is a resistance of Russian citizens. Conformity 
among the Russian populace has not become the staple that Putin wants the world to 
believe them to be. There is an opposition to Putin, even if his rhetoric is focusing around 
just how unified the country has become after a decade of post-Soviet chaos.  
This paper will explain the irony that is arising from Putin’s populist declaration 
of a certain Russian identity. While there is a certain way that Russian conservatives want 
the population to be unified, the results contradict what the long-term goal should be. 
Rather than politicians adjusting their own rhetoric in order to properly represent Russia 




Putin has stated that "everybody should join, coordinate their efforts, their obligations 
and rights in order to maintain the higher historical right of Russia - to be strong."5 The 
centralization of power, symbolically a unification of the entirety of Russia is attempting 
to capitalize on self-sacrifice of the individual in order for Russia to become strong as a 
nation. The contradiction here is that this does not have to be the case, the individual 
makes up a nation, and therefore must be properly represented in order to the nation to be 
truly in unity. While Putin has used anti-Western rhetoric, claims of sovereignty to 
restrict human rights that have origins in Western countries, through his seventeen year 
reign the populace has successfully come together for causes that are uniquely about their 













                                                 
5 "Analysing Putin's Speech." Katehon Think Tank. Geopolitics & Tradition. Katehon Think Tank, 06 






The Bones Remain: Today’s Sociological Structure of Russia 
"Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a 
major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a 
genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found 
themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration 
infected Russia itself."6 
-Vladimir Putin 
The Russian Man’s Type of Nationalism  
  Putin’s centralized government, its actions and the strength it wants to be seen as 
having, are boastfully shown in order to create a nation that is completely personified by 
the government itself. This exclusivity has been created in order to guarantee that the risk 
of Western influences is irrelevant to the unified strength of the Russian identity. Human 
rights especially have been viewed by Putin as just another tool that the West is using to 
destroy the sovereignty that he has over the Russian nation. Putin has stated before that 
“Western states dominate and politicize the human rights agenda [and its cosmopolitan 
way of thinking], using it as a means to exert pressure.”7 In order to deter any potential 
influence that human rights could have on the nation, the government has encouraged the 
population to define themselves as Russian. This Russian identity has been created by the 
government in order to continue an agenda that helps to solidify Putin’s centralization of 
                                                 
6 Sanders, Katie. "Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR 'the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy 
of the 20th Century?'" PunditFact. Politifact.com, 6 Mar. 2014. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
7 Putin, Vladimir. "Vladimir Putin: “Russia and the Changing World”." GlobalResearch. RT, 22 Sept. 




the State under his control. This type of nationalism encourages unity and solidification, 
but this version of civilian harmony requires there to be a conforming populace that is 
willing to be submissive to the State’s strength, maximizing State power. The reasoning 
for this maximization of State power, as explained by the Russian government, is because 
of the West and its agenda against the nation of Russian in its entirety. The Russian 
identity that Putin has encouraged not only needs to be passive to the will of the State, but 
in its fruition, is anti-Western. He has claimed that the Russian identity is under attack by 
the West, who want the Russian identity to not be truly Russian, but to be tainted by the 
influence of European and globalists culture. Therefore, the citizens need to stand behind 
the government’s actions in order to successfully build Russia’s identity. This identity is 
not only about Russian culture but it is also one that is in rejection of human rights and 
other Western concepts. 21st century Russia is one that is defined by the government, the 
Russian state has become the vocal point on how the Russian identity should be defined.   
A Masculine Identity in Putin’s Supporters  
 One essential part of the identity of every individual is how they identify their 
gender and how they want that role to be seen. Stereotypical male masculinity is an 
identity that Putin has heavily encouraged as how a Russian male should be seen and how 
he should act. This has been reflected in Putin’s personal activities, either when he has a 
photo taken of him without his shirt on performing some athletic activity, or when he is 
showing his dominance over corrupt businessmen.8 In order for this masculine stereotype 
to be considered uniquely Russian, Putin has resurrected an old Russian word that he has 
used to embody the Russian male: muzhik. This word originated in tsarist Russia as a 
                                                 
8 Kuznetzov, Alexsei. "Putin Erupts In Struggling Russian Town." CBS News. CBS Interactive, 08 June 




generic term for the serfs or peasants of the landowners. But now in the 21st century putin 
considers himself a muzhik, and wants positive male role models to be viewed as 
muzhiks, such as when he called Leonardo DiCaprio “"a real man" (or "muzhik") for his 
persistence”9 when DiCaprio donated one million dollars to a charity saving Russian 
tigers. Putin’s influence has turned this phrase into a “norm of modern Russian 
masculinity,” finding its way into advertisements, movies, pop songs, and elegies as a 
signifier of “real” manhood.”10  
The reason that Putin wishes to encourage males to be stereotypically masculine 
is because of the strength that lies in this stereotype. The nation of Russia needs to be 
strong and brazen against a world that does not wish for the Russian identity to be seen as 
such, therefore he has encouraged this strength in order to defy the West. Putin’s own 
actions being seen as masculine help bolster support for the preservation of his 
governmental power. “This was again another way of saying that the populist decrees 
who the real people are and supposedly unifies them [ in this case it being Putin in line 
with the common citizens].”11 The strength that men have is supposed to be seen as 
something bigger than just Putin encouraging other men to work out. The purpose is to 
break down the barriers between a president and the average male citizen in order for 
them to be unified by a common strength for a purpose more significant than just the 
individual.  
Feminism’s Contrast to Russian Masculinity 
                                                 
9 "Vladimir Putin: Leonardo DiCaprio Is a 'real Man'." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 24 Nov. 
2010. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
10 Sperling, Valerie. Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia. Page 36. New York: Oxford 
UP, 2015. Print. 
11 Myers, Joanne. "What Is Populism and How Did Trump Use It to Win: Interview with Prof. Jan-
Werner Muller." The #1 Model United Nations Community / MunPlanet. PassBlue, 18 Nov. 2016. 




 While masculinity has been painted by Putin as a way to encourage male Russian 
identity, he considers feminism in juxtaposition to the unity that Russian masculinity 
encourages. Feminism is considered by many Russians to be a Western trifle that has no 
place in Russian society. Feminism is not just unnecessary, but it is detrimental to 
Russian unity by placing the individual before the societal whole. As an ideological 
presence, it has been labeled as an authoritarian directive of globalists that actually slows 
down the development of a feminine Russian identity, rather than enriching it. Putin has 
stated that “[supporting the existence of international powers] does not mean interfering 
in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that 
determines how these states should live and develop. It is obvious that such interference 
does not promote the development of democratic states at all.”12 The promotion of the 
individual through feminism is seen by Putin to not be a priority for the Russian nation. 
The individual needs to first be defined by their identity as part of the nation. Feminism is 
considered to be something that renders a Russian identity as obsolete by being identified 
as a part of a Western agenda. To be a feminist is to not believe in a Russian identity. A 
Russian identity in contrast to feminism is to be part of something more important than 
just your individual needs and also to benefit from a community that is beyond a gender 
identity. Putin identifies feminism to be a motive by Westerners to encourage the 
liquidation of Russian nationalism, to faction off parts of Putin’s Russian identity.  
Finding a Community in a Post-Ideological Society 
 The strong revitalization of a national community is Putin’s way of pulling the 
heartstrings of those Russians who remember the failure of the Soviet Union. The failure 
                                                 
12 Isaac, Jeffrey C. "Thoughts on Putin and Trump." Public Seminar. The Editorial Board of Public 




of communism was the Russian’s failure as part of an international community. This 
international community was one that wished to represent a superstructure that broke 
down barriers between people of tradition and culture in order to see a semblance in 
every person. It was the sacrifice of the individual at a massive scale, and Russia’s failure 
to be part of that is still resonating within the citizens of Russia, who wish to cling to an 
idealistic community that they can claim to be their own. “They said on the radio that 
Lenin’s hand was sawed off from the monument in the center of town in the middle of 
the night. Traded in for scrap…for kopecks. It used to be an icon. An idol! Now, he’s 
nothing but scrap metal.”13 Ideology has been shown to be nothing more than that, an 
idea that only can exist with institutions that stand behind it. Therefore, Putin wants the 
Russian populace to believe in a nationalistic idea that can be taken up by a local 
community, this local community being the Russian people in a world of alienating 
cultures. This localization of thought is in comparison to not just the failure of the Soviet 
system, but of the system that the Western world promotes, one that is globally connected 
by bonds similar to the Soviet Union. The nationalistic claim that Putin endorses is one 
that draws people together by something not ideological, but communal.  
Putin states that this communal union is under attack from the international 
system, which would prefer Russia to be involved in something that is ideological in its 
motivation, and therefore beyond any type of cultural barrier. The cultural barriers that 
define Russia are what hold it together in its identity, and Putin has stressed that there is a 
necessity for a nation to remove any ideological barriers in order to be a nation, rather 
than potentially an international movement. This resonates in the citizens of Russia 
                                                 




because of the fall of the Soviet Union and the proceeding years. During this time 
people’s individuality was revealed through their greed, and people who used to be 
supposedly devoted communists completely reverted to capitalistic agendas that served 
their own purpose. “The Communists aren’t what they used to be. Now [in the 90s] we 
have Communists who make hundreds of thousands of dollars a year. An apartment in 
London, a palace in Cyprus… What kind of communists are these?”14 For those that held 
the Soviet Union dearly, this was a complete shock to them, people around them just 
adjusted their ways of life to the world around them. It was discovered that ideology does 
not truly represent the identity of a community, the person who actually believed in an 
international communist revolution discovered that he was now alone in a post-ideology 
nation. 
Putin’s populist rhetoric is a direct response to the lack of purpose that the 
Russian community has felt in the 90s when Western institutions influenced a country 
that did not know how to identify itself in the capitalistic world that surrounded them. 
Yeltsin’s “policies perfectly suited the Western agenda for Russia, a superpower-turned 
economic and military weakling, a subservient client state and a source of cheap energy 
and minerals.”15 In order for Russia to adjust its way into the capitalistic world Yeltsin 
decided that the aid of the West would help aid the process. Unfortunately, they were not 
able to help fight against the corruption that interfered and turned the nation into a state 
run by mobsters who forced money out of the country. Yeltsin continually had to stay 
submissive to these Western influences in order for him to keep his personal power as the 
                                                 
14 Alexievich, 120 
15 Radyuhin, Vladimir. "Why the West Loved Yeltsin and Hates Putin." The Hindu. The Hindu, 08 Oct. 




first ever president of Russia. It does not matter if the West actually is at fault for the 
damage in the 90s. It does matter though that they influenced the president of Russia 
during a time in which Russia was involved in a horrid economic and sociological crisis, 
therefore Putin is legitimized in say that “rather than bringing about reforms, an 
aggressive foreign interference has resulted in a brazen destruction of national institutions 
and the lifestyle itself.”16 Putin’s purpose as the president of Russia is to get back Russia 
from the influences of Western powers, ones that did not help in the development of 
Russia.  
The Divide Between the Political Perspectives of Russia and the West  
 The emergence of Putin’s rhetoric of a Russia for Russians creates a distinction 
between Russia and other nations, this distinction relies on the motive that for Russia to 
have a strong identity it must refuse to be Europeanized. After ten post-Soviet years of 
cooperation between Europe and Russia, this breaking point was one that Europeans 
heavily disagreed with and continually oppose. Putin has defined Russia as independent 
in who and how its actions are influenced and “this exceptionalism has caused mounting 
problems on the international stage”17 with constant denouncements by Western powers. 
But Putin has twisted these denouncements around, claiming that their purpose is to 
create Western influence in Russia, removing Putin’s sovereignty.  
 This differentiation in political structures between Russia and the West have 
continually supported Putin’s rhetoric that for Russia’s identity for be fully 
conceptualized, it must have no interactions with what could be considered West in 
                                                 
16 Staff, Washington Post. "Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly Speech." The Washington Post. WP 
Company, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
17 Tisdall, Simon. "Putin's Disturbing Message for the West: Your Rules Don't Apply." The Guardian. 




fruition. While European countries are considered states, Russia considers itself to be a 
nation in contrast to those globalist organizations. “The discourse of nations is couched 
especially in terms of passion and identification, what that of states – kindred in many 
ways – is phrased more in terms of reason and interests.”18 The development of Europe 
through the 20th century can be historically viewed as creating different types of globalist 
projects (such as the EU or NATO) that encourage a global sense of comradery and 
tolerance of other nations through universalization of international laws and morals. But 
these globalists projects not only alienate a nation such as Russia that has just so recently 
given itself an autonomous identity, they invariably create contact with such a nation as 
Russia because of the fragility of the Russian identity. This fragility though is due to the 
fact that Putin’s administration are the people who have fabricated the identity of the 
Russian people, rather than an accurate assessment of the Russian population.  
“Nations only exist in the context of nationalism”19 and Putin has encouraged the 
existence of a Russian concept of nationalism and the identity it pursues by contrasting it 
with goals of the globalists. Nationalism and the right to be uniquely Russian have 
become opposed to the existence of such instruments of Western thought such as NATO. 
NATO as an institution has allowed Putin to speak vehemently about the importance for 
Russia as a nation to have strong borders to oppose outsider influences and influencing 
the strength of Russia’s nationalism. Through the post-Soviet years, NATO has slowly 
been moving its own borders closer to Russia. Putin has used these actions to declare that 
the West is trying its best to create pressure on the actions of Russia. He has said before 
that "when a country joins NATO, it becomes next to impossible for it to resist pressure 
                                                 
18 Calhoun, Craig. Nationalism. Page 3. Buckingham: Open U.P., 1997. Print. 




from a major NATO leader such as the United States and hence it may deploy anything - 
a missile defense system, new bases or, if need be, missile strike systems."20 The variable 
of uncertainty gives Putin an advantage when he is talking about a threat from the West 
that the Russian identity faces. The idea of potential danger encourages fearmongering 
among politicians such as Putin who need a unified population to be in agreement with 
the centralized government. Danger from outside Russia’s borders encourages a national 
identity that needs to stay strong in times of hypothetical danger.  
NATO is viewed by Russian politicians as continuing a Cold war agenda against 
the potential of Russian growth, either financially, militaristically, or from a 
sociologically. The current Russian administration believes that its goals to become a 
thriving nation are being prevented by the expansion of NATO’s borders. “The 
Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet 
expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong 
North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political 
integration.”21 The continuation of NATO’s existence is perceived as evidence that 
Russia is under attack from the West and its beliefs. 
Putin’s actions against this hypothetical threat from the West have increased with 
zeal over the course of his regime’s time in office, finding new ways to label certain 
identities or ways of thinking Western in order to guarantee the continuation of his 
centralized power. One way has been a law passed in 2012 that is able to label certain 
NGOs as being foreign agents, the purpose of such a law aids Putin’s agenda to have 
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control over how the public is influenced by political presences. NGOs are labeled as 
foreign agents if they are involved in “political activity”, to include virtually any form of 
commentary on public policy or the actions of public officials.”22 In this light NGOs have 
been seen as extensions of NATO in their agenda against the revitalization of a Russian 
identity that is exclusively influenced by Russian culture.  
Comparing Representational Strength of the Presidents of Russia 
 This exclusively Russian influence that would mold an identity for the population 
has been attempted to be centralized around the image of Putin and the populist regime 
that he controls. Putin as an individual, rather than as the State, wants to set an example 
for who the Russian identity should be and how he (as the masculine image) should act. 
This image of a man who considers his strength to be self-reliant helps propel the esteem 
of the nation itself. “Putin’s popularity derives from his embodiment of hegemonic 
masculinity.”23 This stereotypical view of a masculine male brings forth an identity that 
does not need the aid of others, and therefore able to handle any situation at hand while 
keeping his dignity. Putin as a figure head is a man who is able to handle any situation 
and as long as he has complete control over the nation of Russia, Russia will be fine.  
 Putin wants his position as head of a centralized government to be in contrast to 
Boris Yeltsin as a president who is the embodiment of Russian identity. Yeltsin in 
comparison is seen as an example of a Western politician and therefore has ruined the 
potential for Russia to have Western influences. “Despite positive attitudes toward 
market democratic reform, Yeltsin, and the West and an unthreatening international 
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environment, liberal internationalists were accused of betraying Russia's national 
interests in pursuing policies unbecoming to Russia's historical status.”24 The behavior of 
Yeltsin towards the international realm was seen by the populace of Russia as submissive 
to greater powers than Russia by accepting its role as a State among other States, being 
seen an insignificant to the bigger picture. “Yeltsin was not just an unpopular president: 
he was the first politician whom Russians had ever trusted.”25 This trust and the betrayal 
of it is what sparked the desire for the Russian nation to find a president that is strong and 
shameless in representing Russia as a country that has to put its own interests before 
those of the international world.   
The representation of a positive role model has been continually generated by 
Putin in the press,26 drawing out just how explicitly different he and Yeltsin are. This 
emphasize is heavily pushed in order for it to seem like there is a correlation between 
how somebody is in their personal life and their professional life. Putin gained popularity 
because in contrast to Yeltsin, who was inebriated in front of the camera on many 
occasions and had multiple heart attacks by the time he left office due to poor health, 
Putin is viewed as somebody who could potentially be a good role model for how you 
should live your personal life.  
But initially Yeltsin was seen as good candidate to be the first president of Russia 
due to how he was viewed. The people viewed him as being a president that is 
militaristically driven and therefore determined to pave a future for Russia. Much of this 
                                                 
24 Clunan, Anne L. "Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia's Pursuit of 
International Status." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47.3-4 (2014): 283. Web. 
25 “Gessen, Masha. The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. Page 12. NY, NY, USA: 
Riverhead, 2014. Print. 
26 This ranges from Putin finding an opportunity to take a shirtless photo while fishing or holding a 
rifle, or even a video of said president lifting weights with his Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev. The 




enthusiasm was due to the success of the 1991 coup and Yeltsin’s role as a representative 
for a new Russia, a new nation. When the coup had ended one image struck people as a 
perfect example of how Yeltsin was a great choice for becoming the president of Russia. 
It is a photograph of Yeltsin on a tank, with the tri-colored flag of Russia waving in the 
wind behind him as he is making a speech on the great future of the Russian people.27 
This pride in militarism, with a president on a tank, and the power that holds is an 
essential part to how the Russian identity has been seen over the years. “[The Soviet] 
ideology was also militarized. But Gorbachev was profoundly civilian.”28 Yeltsin brought 
back the militaristic strength that the Russian population was looking for in a leader that 
was the choice of the people.  
A huge part of his downfall is due to the fact that it the population of Russia 
eventually realized that Yeltsin was not the one directing the nation towards its 
determined future. Casting Western stigma aside, the head of the Russian nation is 
somebody that has been seen as the individual that will lead the nation into the future. 
But if there those that are influencing the president and directing his actions, then it is 
determined that he cannot represent the people, because he is not even representing 
himself.  
This dual representation of one’s self and the country is essential in order to 
understand how Putin is able to deem his sovereignty as the most important factor in 
guaranteeing the sanctity of the Russian people and their unique culture. His symbolic 
representation of the country allows him to justify actions that would be deemed 
undemocratic in most governments of the world. “We see that populists [such as Putin] 
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will justify whatever they are doing in the name of their basic monopoly to moral 
representation of the people.”29 The question of rights and the individual they represent 
are considered irrelevant trifles that just damage the nations progress. This internal 
damage arises due to the fact that rights inherently give people power, power that can be 
used to challenge the sovereignty of Putin. Therefore, Putin continually states that human 
rights do not belong in Russia due to the fact that if rights are to be enabled then Putin, 
the man who has deemed himself a representative for what the Russian identity is, can 
lose his seat of power and with him the loss of the Russian identity.  
Identity in Conformity 
With Putin representing what he has determined to be the Russian identity, he 
declares that it is necessary for the citizens of Russia to submit in unity to his Russian 
government in order to preserve their identity against a global threat. When Western 
powers denounce the actions of Putin, they are not just denouncing his government but 
also the nation in its entirety by doing so. This has reinvigorated Western-based 
fearmongering, allowing nationalistic notions to reshape a perception of the West as truly 
against being opposed to the Russian way of life. “[Soviet citizens] made everything up, 
and, as it later turned out, everything [the Soviet citizens] thought [they] knew was 
nothing but figments of [their] imaginations: The West.”30 Nationalists needed to recreate 
the image of what Russia was and how it related to the West in order to bolster fear of 
international presences. Putin’s brazen nature adds tension to the international realm due 
to the responses he receives from the West. He then twists this dialogue around in order 
for it to be perceived as though his, and therefore the nation’s, sovereignty are under 
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assault because the West does not want Russia to grow to its full potential as an 
independent nation.  
 Putin’s nationalism that is supposed to represent the majority has to have this 
enemy in the West in order for there to be a powerful rejection of human rights. With this 
validation of Western desires that conflict with the majority interest of Russia, Putin 
centralizes power in order to draw an oppositional distinction between these two groups 
of people. The populist goal of the Russian government is that with this distinction 
Russian citizens can easily see how they should identify themselves in order to do their 
part against a Western threat. “In the short term – where most governments actually live 
[, Russia being no exception] – democracy and human rights often conflict, and popular 
sovereignty for a majority is often achieved at the cost of ethnic cleansing [or a less 
extreme action of ostracizing] a minority.”31 The Russian identity is created from the top 
down in order for there to be an established structural identity that can be identified from 
its initial birth as being part of a strong institution. It does not need the consent of the 
population due to the fact that this identity surrounds the world that they live in. The 
Russian population is pressured into being part of this identity out of a desire to be 
viewed as a real Russian in the eyes of the State. People have to cooperate with Putin’s 
administration and the identity that they have created in order to feel as though they are 
truly part of the Russian world.  
 People cast aside their individuality in order to become part of a unified state that 
Putin can dictate and control through his sovereignty. Rights of the individual have to be 
compromised in Putin’s Russia in order for the government to have real control over this 
                                                 





unified identity that will unquestionably support their actions. Strength through unity is 
what Putin believes will be the salvation of the Russian identity in the 21st century, 
allowing it to be heard in the international realm while still being allowed to keep its 
independently decided decisions as a nation. On New Year’s Eve of 1999 Putin wrote 
and published an essay titled Russia on the Threshold of the New Millennium where he 
stated that he “welcomed recent “positive changes”, especially the Russian people’s 
embrace of “supranational universal values” such as freedom of expression and travel, as 
well as “fundamental human rights and political liberties”. But he also highlighted 
traditional “Russian values”, especially patriotism – pride in “a nation capable of great 
achievements” – and “social solidarity”, which, he asserted, had “always prevailed over 
individualism.””32 Putin has deemed that while he believes and comprehends why the 
globalists work the way they work, those attributes cannot be part of the modern-day 
Russia, at least for now. Russian’s need a traditional culture that is designed exclusively 
for them in order to establish an identity that can unify a country in nationalistic 
patriotism. Even though Putin claims that he recognizes the significance of human rights, 
over the years as he has centralized more power he has done all that he can to identify 
human rights as not globalist, but Western with the goal of destroying the unifying 
strength of Russia.  
Social solidarity has shifted in Russia into a sphere that is controlled by the power 
that Putin has grabbed over the course of the 21st century. The individual, his wellbeing is 
cast aside for a supposed façade of the national identity through strength and pride. Putin 
has “treated each individual as directly a member of the state. The political community 
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thus became the whole people (even if it was granted little power).”33 The community 
must follow and conform to the actions of the government in order to be deemed as a 
proper Russian citizen. If an individual chooses not to follow in line with this identity, 
then they are rejected as members of the community around them. They are labeled as 
detrimental to Russian society and the progression of the Russian nation. Therefore, as a 
member of Russian society they must be supportive of the Russian government that has 
deemed itself as the Russian identity, rather than the actual Russian citizens.  
Russia’s Compensation of Strength for a Loss of Identity 
 This strange contradiction in which the government, rather than the genuine 
citizen is thought-out as the Russian identity has been considered a necessity in order for 
Russia to not become a victim of Western influence in the post-Soviet world. Russia 
wants to have the freedom to develop its own identity without the support of a pre-
created structure that was thought up by non-Russians. After seventy hard years of 
sacrifice, only to end up with a loss of their identity, losing this identity inadvertently to 
the Western world. Putin has pandered to the Russian identity as being in a tangential 
spot after the loss of an international identity with an ideological movement at the hands 
of another international identity with an opposing ideological mindset. Modern day 
Russia has attempted to neuter the significance of losing personal identity in Russia by 
emphasizing the importance that comes with societal structures that are strong enough to 
resist pressure opposing them. Without this unity Putin’s power will crumble, enabling 
the Russian population to gain a real voice. But Putin has stated that it is not his own 
                                                 




personal power that will fall apart, but the country in its entirety, governmental strength 
needs to be enforced in order for there to be stability.  
The government of Russia states that its doctrine to be one that needs to exist in 
order for the population of Russia to live the best lives they could possibly have. In 
accordance to this way of thinking, those Russian citizens that protest against the current 
Russian identity are considered by the government to be part of the problem. They are 
labeled by the State as not concerned citizens of the same nation, but rather people who 
are just destructive and unproductive in their actions. Putin has said that “the absence of 
civil accord and unity is one of the reasons why our reforms are so slow and painful. 
Most of our energy is spent on political squabbling, instead of handling the concrete steps 
toward Russia's renewal.”34 These are Putin’s distorted concerns with those Russians who 
disagree with him one way or another. Putin’s definition of civil accord is not simply a 
sense of harmony among the populace, but rather one of submission. But this type of 
submission does not declare the nation of Russia to be one that is weak in its integrity. 
Putin wants this submission to be not be viewed an act of degradation, but an act that 
perceives the populations trust in what Putin’s government wants to do, allowing Putin to 
be in full control of the fate of Russia.  
So those Russian citizens that disagree with Putin and the identity he wants to 
implant are attempting to become as alienated as possible from the world that surrounds 
them. Representing their lives through the public sphere has become an impossibility due 
to the harshness of Putin’s strength. If these individuals are to declare to the world around 
them that they exist and identify as Russian citizens, then those other citizens who follow 
                                                 





Putin’s creed will respond with a resounding no, these individuals do not fit the 
governments criteria as individuals with Russian identities. For the common citizen “it’s 
possible to live well in Russia as long as you stay out of politics”35 but these people’s 
identities are practically vanishing from the public’s reality. “This is made especially 
important by the political ideologies emphasizing citizenship, for the participation of 
citizens demands a kind of lateral connection to each other and a kind of exclusive 
loyalty to the state not required by empires and other older forms of polity.”36 It is not 
just that these identities do not belong in Russia, but that these identities cannot belong in 
Russia due to the Russian state’s definition of citizenship. Populism has become the 
political structure that binds a majority to a certain identity made by the State and 
removes minorities unique existences from public knowledge.  
The Russian’s Desire for a Government representing Russians 
 Much of the popularity for Putin’s populist government came from the promise of 
a strong government to represent the Russian population. Putin’s actions, and the reason 
that the majority of Russian citizens are satisfied with his authoritarian techniques, are a 
reaction against the lack of control that the Russian government had during the 90s. The 
brazen nature of Putin seems embarrassing to many Westerners, but for Russians the 
concept of a bold and shameless president is something that they take pride in. If there is 
an air of confidence at the top, then the rest of the nation feels as though that proper 
individual is leading the nation someway into the future, rather than allowing some other 
influence to be in control. Putin’s role is supposed to be symbolism for the country and 
its relation to the 90s, where there was corruption, now there is strength.  
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 Corruption was the staple for how the Russian government worked during the 
90s, most importantly with the inclusion of Boris Yeltsin being on the oligarch’s payroll. 
“[I]n this country people no longer [felt] that the country’s territory belongs to them, to 
the citizenry”37 and the government was not purposed to serve the population, as it 
should, but rather to aid the wealthiest individuals who could pay off the State for 
ultimate control. The State in its entirety had been bought by the most successful 
members of capitalism, those who understood how it worked, while everyone else was 
exploited by utilizing their complete lack of understanding on how the free market 
worked. Putin as a political candidate wanted to be seen in opposition to these oligarchs 
by being relatable to the common citizen as a “man of the people”. “After university, 
Putin spent half a year pushing papers at the KGB offices in Leningrad. Then he spent six 
months going to KGB officer school. “It was an entirely unremarkable school in 
Leningrad.” he told his biographers.”38 Putin wanted to play down any dramatization that 
would make his life seem to be unusual in any way in order not to risk alienating the 
majority populace of Russia. “They [, the writers of Putin’s biography] were not there to 
investigate the man; their job was to write down a legend.” This mythos though was to be 
based off of not the individual that Putin is, but of the man of Putin’s Russian identity, 
the man who everyone is encouraged to become.  
 Putin simply used Yeltsin’s unfortunate circumstance and bad decision making to 
his advantage in creating a reaction to the political corruption of the 90s. The response 
was able to be molded in such a specific way that allowed Putin to be viewed as the 
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candidate who return the representative power to the people from oligarchs. Oligarchs 
were the term that “was used in Russia to describe certain affluent and influential Russian 
businessmen who helped Yeltsin to be re-elected in 1996”, even though he had a dismal 
10% approval rating just in 1992, and left office “with an approval rating as low as 2% by 
some estimates.” The opinion of the majority became completely irrelevant in the face of 
extraordinary wealth. Not only did these oligarchs gain the deciding factor for how the 
government was run, but they also had nothing in common with the common man and 
just blatantly exploited the populace to their advantage. Putin’s image was made to make 
it seem as though he was the choice that the majority population had made even though 
he was practically unknown when he was declared as the next president of Russia. But 
with his time in office he has played up the power of the people as something that he is 
gratefully for, and therefore properly represents.  
Putin’s Symbolic Justice for Populism 
Putin created this false appreciation for his populist support by punishing 
oligarchs who had gained independent wealth, dividing themselves off from the rest of 
the population. For the common man, there was no State that was there for their benefit, 
so Putin exploited this anger and created a populist schadenfreude that was at the 
oligarch’s expense. This was to prove that the State was back in command of Russia in its 
entirety. In the 90s, much of the natural gas and mineral industries (ones that are the top 
exports of Russia’s trade)39 were controlled by oligarchs (many of which had deep 
connections with the mafia or were mobsters themselves). The nature of what was wrong 
or right was not determined by any political force, but by those that had enough money to 
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do whatever they wanted. Through this action there was just a cycle in which the 
oligarchs expanded their businesses and the power that came with it. Due to the lack of 
power in the government decisions were made by those who could. The populist support 
for Putin’s monopolization of power a reaction to this.   
The current Russian regime has been able to centralize the power of the 
government with the approval of the majority in order to make sure that no independently 
controlled structures can have more power in Russian than the Russian government itself. 
The freedom of the individual that the 90s allowed and the exploitation that came with 
that have been twisted around by the Russian state to be perceived as being 
interconnected. When Putin had been elected to be president on the eve of the new 
millennium he wrote that a “major issue [of the 90s] is the rational regulation of natural 
monopolies. This is a key question, as they largely determine the structure of production 
and consumer prices. They therefore influence both economic and financial processes, as 
well as people's income.”40 Putin believes that those who are in charge of monopiles 
practically control the fate of the majority, therefore the only monopoly of power that 
there can be in Russia must be the Russian government. But for this monopoly of power 
to be legitimized as the Russian government it needs to be the government of the people. 
This monopolization also applies to the population and the identity that that population 
has. The majority has the desire to view themselves as a power, so Putin has taken the 
majority as the monopolization of what the Russian identity is. This action makes the 
majority believe themselves to be the ones with the real power over the State.  
The Sacrifice of Personal Agency for the Sake of Nationalistic Unity 
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 While Putin’s reaction against the 90s oligarchs did establish him as the face of 
populist Russia, since then he has had to create new forces of opposition in order for his 
centralized power to be continually legitimized. One classic way of legitimizing his 
power has been by utilizing scapegoats in order the it to seem like there is a perceived 
threat. Nationalism and its xenophobic activity have been powerful attributes in the 
rhetoric of the Russian regime. The fear that xenophobia has created allows Putin to force 
his Russian identity upon the citizens. He has portrayed foreigners as not just people from 
different nations, but as people who are different from the Russian identity. Due to the 
fact that the Russian identity is not clearly defined outside of Putin’s propaganda, he has 
monopolized the definition of the Russian identity, creating a nationalistic unity that only 
he can dictate for. 
 The average Russian not only has to be weary of the foreigner, but now even a 
Russian citizen can be perceived as dangerous. These outliers of Russian society have 
become people viewed as non-Russian due to their differing opinions from the 
government. “Because these ideas about dignity, worth, and human sacredness appear to 
confuse what is with what ought to be, they are controversial, and because they are 
controversial, they are likely to garment commitment to the practical responsibilities 
entailed by human rights instead of strengthening them.”41 The Russian government has 
twisted the significance of the Russian identity around in order to pursue their own 
agenda. People in Russia are made to believe that they owe something towards the 
betterment of the Russian government, as though they are dependent on the survivability 
of the current administration. Outliers in Russian society are invariably to contain the 
                                                 




same identity of those beyond the borders of Russia. Their words of dissidence have the 
potential to damage the unity of Russia and the identity that bonds the populace together 
underneath Putin. Nationalism in Russia has further distanced the divide between the 
concept of free speech and conformity. 
 This aggression against differing opinions, even if they are from citizens of 
Russia, come from a fear of independent thought. In Russia unity powered by the 
population’s loyalty has always equated to a powerful State. This powerful State is not a 
perk in Putin’s mind, he believes that an essential part of the Russian identity is to rely on 
the government as the controlling factor in a citizen’s life. Putin claims that in a historical 
context “the majority of Russians are used to depending more on the state for 
improvements in their own condition than with their own efforts, initiatives, and flair for 
business. And it will take a long time for this habit to die.”42 Putin believes that the 
Russian populace is not able to advance as a community by their own terms. This type of 
freedom in his mind is not possible, the government has to funnel the populace down a 
very specific trench in order for the community to advance. In these terms, Putin is 
stating that grassroots organizations, movements centered around rights and most 
importantly ran by local citizens cannot be run by Russians simply because they do not 
know how to.  
 For Putin, this personal agency of the citizen is something he cannot have in order 
to keep the power that he has. So, he has created implications that the government needs 
to be there for the citizens in order for there to be stability and improvements built on top 
of this stability. “[But] human rights is a language of individual empowerment, and 
                                                 





empowerment for individuals is desirable because when individuals have agency, they 
can protect themselves against injustices.”43 The majority populace of Russia is unaware 
of the agency they can declare on the nation. Putin has downplayed the significance of 
the individual in order to enhance the allure of a unified nation. Such public actions like 
the 2012 election protests not only can create a declaration of the awareness of the 
citizen’s power, but it then has the potential to create awareness among other members of 
the citizenry.44 This potential for the population to realize its true power and the fragility 
of a populist government has unfortunately not been fully realized. This lack of 
realization is due to the government’s ability to create an illusion that the Russian identity 
was created by the population, rather than fabricated by the government in control.  
The Illusion of Personal Agency in Russian Life 
 The government has slowly been able to utilize its amassed power into convincing 
the majority of the population that they are the ones who control the country, that Putin 
really is just their representation. This has allowed the government’s actions to be 
continually justified as just the will of the people, twisting and mocking the definition of 
a real democracy. While propaganda and oppression are essential parts of how the 
Russian government works, the citizen does not see their lives as ones that are oppressed. 
This is due to the common Russian citizen’s perspective on how his life is informed and 
therefore narrated. Media being Putin’s essential delivery vehicle to the population has 
allowed the government to portray Western news as simply fake. The media states that 
the Western news organizations are attempting to fabricate a world that works around 
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their agenda against the sanctity of Russian life, while ironically the Russian media is 
doing the exact same thing. The people are told that the Russian government simply exist 
in order to peruse the democratic and properly represented nation.  
 Due to this illusion of agency the populace does not see the need to have human 
rights in their thinking, they have been made to believe that the State has given them 
every civil right they could ever need. With the citizens of Russia being content with the 
supposed rights that they have been given, the actions that the government does 
afterwards are thought of as insignificant for the population which believes that they have 
all they could possibly have. “The ideologies of nation and nationalism were born partly 
as ways of icing specific form and shape to citizenship in the world.”45 The illusion that 
the population has made the choice to be shaped in this identity has gone to create a 
populace that sees their government as a government that has finally listened to their 
requests after years of not being exclusively represented as a nation and the identity that 
nation embodies.  
Russia’s Identity Problem 
 The ironic part about Putin’s version of the Russian identity is that it is a lie. It 
does not really unify the Russian population because every individual does not abide by 
the identity that Putin has dictated onto the populace. “The Russian people’s happiness 
has never had anything to do with money. That’s the difference between the “Russian 
idea” and the American Dream.”46 Russian’s don’t have some type of ideological goal to 
reach as individual citizens, they sympathize with their historical communities instead of 
with their own selves, and this have been exploited by the government for its own 
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benefit. Russia’s fake identity, the one that the government promotes creates a sense of 
rootlessness with members of the population, this is core reason for how and why Russia 
operates the way it does in the world today due to its lack of self-comprehension.  
 The government of Russia is only able to consider those civilians that are willing 
to submit to the nationalistic agenda set by Putin. People who do not wish to conform are 
excluded from Putin’s picture of a united Russia, which will exist with or without those 
who are considered nonconformists. Therefore, what will happen to those that are not 
recognized as being part of Russia, even though they have been born and raised there? 
“Home, it has famously been said, is the place where they always have to take you in. In 
an important sense, it is this sense of having a home that many important people derive 
from ideas of membership in a nation.”47 If Putin and his centralized government are 
supposed to be viewed as a government that really is there for every person, then those 
undesirables have only one choice, to disappear. Their identities do not align with how 
the majority wants to be seen, and therefore there is really no other choice for these 
individuals, their identities have no worth as Russian citizens.  
This inaction of a singular Russian identity cannot continue if the nation wishes to 
develop and grow in actual unity. But Putin’s Russian state cannot abide by individuals 
and the rights they deserve because they cannot risk the potential for there to be a 
stronger institution than the government itself. “The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [, globally recognized as the heart of human rights] represented a return by the 
European tradition to its natural law heritage, a return intended to restore agency, to give 
individuals the civic courage to stand up when the state ordered them to do wrong.”48 
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Putin does not care about the West, and he does not care about how the nation of Russia 
is influenced by the West, this is only rhetoric to motivate the populace to have 
something that will bring them closer to Putin’s state. What Putin does care about is a 
restored agency in the population of Russia and the concept of a unification of the 
population which is not controlled by the State.  
Russia’s Current Position Between Stagnation and Progression 
 This identity that Putin has forced onto the population cannot work, it will not 
work. Individuality is an essential part of human nature, and for a nation to properly work 
together all walks of life must be accounted for, this is what human rights wants to 
achieve. Contrary to Putin’s rhetoric, rights are not determined by culture, but by 
individuals who make up that culture. Even if Putin will not acknowledge how human 
rights should be properly defined, the population of Russia needs to conceptualize human 
rights as something that can be uniquely Russian. This would appeal to both the 
marginalized individuals in Russia and the nationalists who want a Russia that is defined 
by exclusively being Russian. It would also benefit both groups by properly unifying 
them as Russian, creating the real Russian identity that has been lost in generations of 












A Lashing of Tongues: The Vocabulary of the Human Rights Argument 
“One cannot but weep just thinking about it. But compassion, tears, and words on the part 
of the government are absolutely insufficient. We have to act, we have to increase the 
effectiveness of the government in combating the entire complex of problems facing the 
country…”49 
-Vladimir Putin 
Putin’s Institutions against Western Thought 
 In order for Putin’s Russian identity to successfully define its nation as being 
something completely Russian, the government has utilized institutions and tools to 
separate itself from the world around it. Putin’s state has created a barrier between 
Russian and Western thought through structures and ways of thinking that the 
government has labeled as completely and uniquely Russian. These institutions are not 
just labeled as Russian due to their unique traits, but because their strong traditional 
structures are in contradiction to the open mindset of Western thinking. This creates a 
dichotomy of ideological contradictions in which Russia propels itself by being 
exclusively Russian. But these tools are not used to propel the Russian identity, but to 
guarantee Putin’s exclusive power. Through Putin’s Russian identity though, there is a 
transparency between Putin’s personal agenda and the sovereignty of the Russian nation. 
Therefore, Western influence in Russia has become choked out under the pretext of being 
in opposition of Russia’s sovereignty. The tools that the government has used to remove 
                                                 




Western influence completely encompasses a citizen’s way of life. The structures that 
will be talked about in this chapter are the president’s unique position, Russia’s claim to 
sovereignty, the Russian Orthodox church, the traditional family, the justice system, the 
mental psyche of the individual, and the media. Each one of these structures creates a 
divide that solidifies in one way or another the significance that the Russian nation is 
imbued with. But within the significance of the Russian nation comes the significance of 
the Russian identity, created with these institutions that have the power to claim personal 
sovereignty in order to imbue Putin with real control over an aspect of the Russian nation.  
Strong President, Submissive Supporters 
 One of the most essential tools that Putin has utilized to deviate his Russian 
identity as the true identity of the nation is his position as the president of Russia. The 
strong president is a Russian trait that the citizens want as a reflection of their unified 
character as a nation. This is the type of president that will only support actions that are 
beneficial for his people. Yeltsin on the other hand is so heavily criticized because he was 
considered a submissive president whose actions were heavily influenced by liberal 
politicians who wanted Yeltsin to think globally rather than locally. It is not who 
influences the president that matters though, but rather the fact that he takes other 
people’s opinions so seriously. Putin is considered a good president due to his confidence 
in his own actions. His decisive nature is something that the majority population wants in 
a president, this decisiveness can be something they can rely on. This independently 
thinking individual helps solidify the populist rhetoric, influencing a desire for the 




 As a president who is considered independently strong, he wants there to be faith 
in every aspect that represents the country he believes to be leading into the future. 
Putin’s speeches normalize this identity, one which juxtaposes Western and globalizing 
thought. This type of personality as a vocalized leader creates “what Michel Foucault 
called a ‘discursive formation’ a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness”50 and 
influences those who hear what he says. When the population has this continual exposure 
to Putin’s actions and his speeches the meaning behind his words become legitimized 
through normalization. But in the West Putin’s rhetoric is continually shocking due to the 
fact that the West is not exclusively exposed to his discourse as the Russian population is. 
Therefore, the Russian population doesn’t understand why the West responds the way it 
does, supporting Putin’s claim that the West wishes to destroy Russian culture just 
because they act independently.  
Putin’s response to Western statements about his brazen nature is deemed as 
necessary in the face of globalization, because if Putin can be threatened, then so can the 
rest of the nation. With this type of president Russia is trying to be perceived by its 
population as a government one can entirely rely. This reliance depends on having 
complete faith in nationalistic pride which disregards any voice from outside of Russia, 
even if it is a voice of reason. Independence and with it the ability to make decisions with 
no one else’s input is an essential part of the Russian identity from Putin’s perspective. 
He has asked the question of “what is the meaning of state sovereignty? It basically 
means freedom, every person and every state being free to choose their future”51 is his 
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answer to this, explaining his actions as the representative power of Russia. Freedom is 
taken in incredibly broad terms by the Russian government. They have removed factual 
logic in order to fuel a nationalistic façade that can supply an answer for every question. 
It’s fairly similar to how faith worked in the Soviet Union where “you used to be able to 
get up in the morning, read Pravda, and know all you needed to know, understand 
everything you needed to understand.”52 Putin wants the pride that Russian citizens have 
for their nation to be something unquestionably perfect in design. The criticism that the 
Russian government receives from the West would just encourage the Russian identity to 
believe in this flawless structure that is facing a world which wants to destroy its national 
sovereignty.  
This façade is in a state of continually being an institutional presence in the 
citizens lives when it is talked about and invoked in one way or another. This presence 
can be created either from the West’s reactions or from the citizens, regardless if they 
believe in it or not. But for the façade to become strong this illusion of flawless 
nationalism becomes stronger when more citizens follow in Putin’s footsteps, creating a 
cycle of increasing supporters. This political faith is symbolized in Putin, who is able to 
dictate and display how important the sovereignty of Russia is in order for the Russian 
identity to be kept safe from outsider influence. While there are many other tools that are 
utilized to encourage this façade of nationalistic perfection, they are all directed by 
Putin’s figurehead position as the leader of the Russian nation. “[T]he embodiment in 
politics of the patriarchal hierarchy on which they rest shapes citizens’ perception of the 
public sphere and way in which political power should be distributed.”53 
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Centralizing Russian Power against Human Rights 
 In order to preserve this sovereignty, which resides in the personal power that 
Putin holds, organizations with Western origins have become identified not by their 
purpose, but by an agenda that Putin has imposed onto the citizens. This populism is 
supposed to oppose Western NGOs due to the supposition that those organizations, due to 
their Western origins are in Russia with the intention to destroy Russian sovereignty 
because they are potentially in opposition to Putin’s agenda. If a NGO is involved in any 
way involved in “political activity”, then it must be registered as a foreign agent with the 
risk of continual repercussion’s once the government has added them to the list of foreign 
agent organizations. “In the last four years, 148 non-governmental organizations have 
been included on the list of “foreign agents” in Russia, of which 27 have closed down 
altogether.”54 With this law the government has been able to easily track the actions of 
these NGOs in case they dare to oppose the government in some way.  
 This law helps the Russian government create the distinction between the nation 
against a Western world which has an agenda that does not include the freedom of choice 
which the Russian identity wants to have. Anything from the West needs to be labeled as 
being part of the West, not just literality, but from an institutionalized way of thinking. 
Just because an organization was conceived in the West makes it automatically 
indoctrinated into a globalized way of thinking, opposing the Russian way of life. The 
reason for this type of statist loyalty is a reflection of Putin’s opinions on the Russian 
identity. The Russian identity for him is one that is loyal to the State due to the fact that 
he is a representative member of this nationalistic community, if that citizen decides to 
                                                 
54 International, Amnesty. "Agents of the People: Four Years of Foreign Agents Law in Russia." 




oppose the State then he is supporting the West. The amount of control that Putin has 
needs to be justified, and labeling NGOs as representatives of foreign ideas allows Putin 
to be seen as having a reason to be controlling so much of the State.  
Russia’s Moral Superiority  
 The national identity of Russia that Putin projected also needed a reason to be 
special and unique compared to the West, something more than just a need to protect 
their sovereignty. The result was an identity that was morally superior in its hard-lined 
traditional ways compared to the progressive tolerance of the West, which accepted any 
doctrine, itself having no real cultural distinction. The West’s sense of tolerance cannot 
compare itself when Russia declares its presence as being morally superior because of the 
West’s lack of nationalistic groundings. In comparison to Russia the West gives off an 
impression of being a void of acceptance that really has no identity of its own. Traditions 
define the Russian identity as having a structure which determines how something can be 
considered Russian.  
 Things that have been considered Western due to tolerance towards them have 
been deemed as unacceptable for the Russian government and the identity it perpetuates. 
In order for things to be determined as anti-Russian in thought Putin has tried to erase 
them from the public sphere of Russian thought. If they do not exist in the public eye, 
then one cannot acknowledge them as being a part of the community. Members of the 
marginalized LGBTI community are a perfect example in the Russian world because 
their sexualities are considered by Putin to not be part of their identities, but a personal 
choice. In order to try to remove non-heteronormativity’s existence from his Russian 




individuals face. “The effect of the so-called “propaganda law” was to severely restrict 
the right to freedom of expression of LGBTI individuals and groups and foster increased 
and widespread discrimination and harassment against them.”55 This belief that 
homosexuality is something that can be spread through education continually fuels the 
belief that tolerant thought is not for the acceptance of people who are different out of no 
choice of their own, but who choose to be different and are deviant because of their 
decision to do so. Putin has made sure to balance out this law to not seem so incredibly 
critical of individuals who were born differently.  
“"We do not have a ban on non-traditional sexual relationships," said Putin in 
comments reported by Russian agencies. "We have a ban on the propaganda of 
homosexuality and paedophilia. I want to underline this. Propaganda among children. 
These are absolutely different things – a ban on something or a ban on the 
propaganda of that thing."” 56 
Putin is bringing international ideological notions of thought while trying to 
downplay the impact that the propaganda law would have on the LGBTI community by 
stating that there is no real LGBTI community in Russia. There are no reason children 
should be educated about sexual identifications that are not a part of the Russian identity. 
Normalizing these minorities would be a rejection of the freedom that Russia holds 
because these minorities are part of the Western identity. For the homosexual community, 
this makes it incredibly difficult to be taken seriously as a legitimate group of people. 
This lack of recognition creates a lack of responsibility from the side of the government 
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for the safety of the targeted group because of the division between the Russian people 
and LGBTI individuals as part of a non-Russian identity. The division is funneled by an 
illusion of ignorance of who homosexuals are and the scientific reality that their sexuality 
is not a choice originating in Western influence but rather something entirely out of their 
control. To completely ignore the factor is ignoring scientific reasoning. This creates a 
reality that appeals to Putin’s conservative crowd, a self-belief that they are in the right. 
This correctness is part of the nationalistic appeal that Putin is encouraging in the 
populace. Every individual who is a representative of the Russian identity is someone the 
majority populace would consider to be like them, one of the common citizens. This 
commonality in a majority population ordains their moral superiority as something 
exclusive to the Russian identity that they want to be a symbolic representation of.  
The Russian Orthodox Church: Russia’s Moral Legitimizer 
 For the Russian identity to be considered as moral superior in its traditional ways, 
the Orthodox Church has become an essential resource to label the Russian populace as 
following the proper steps that God has laid out for them. The Church represents both 
Putin’s Russian identity, giving it a divine sense of justification for their actions as a 
unified state, ordained by a heavenly presence. Faith in a higher power is an essential part 
Putin’s nationalistic façade which emphasizes the importance of freedom against 
international presences. This faith is in the government’s freedom to be the monopolizing 
power in the Russian nation, being the determiner for the nation’s future. The Church’s 
presence solidifies this necessity for the community to have faith in its State by giving 




Putting have demonstrated a relationship of mutual reliance and apparent admiration.”57 
These two institutions have become entangled in order to build a national identity that 
supports its own beliefs and convinces the populace of its importance by displaying its 
moralistic significance.  
 By combining the institutional significance that the Church has and the State has 
in a realm that thrives on nationalistic significance, Putin’s actions are seen as the highest 
importance in leading the populace. This monopolization of what is morally good while 
Putin is running a government, that cannot always be perfect in its actions due to the 
morally grey nature of politics, has vast potential for solidifying power and support 
without having repercussions. The Russian identity wants to be approved for having 
strength and solidarity in something a community can believe in as a congregation would. 
This labeling of the moral high ground that a certain society gains from their justified 
reasons of why and how they can do the things they do is essential to why westernized 
(or traditional) human rights cannot be incorporated into modern-day Russian society. 
The moral representation that God imbues means that any type of rhetoric the 
international realm of human rights might have are insignificant in the grand scheme of 
things. Even if human rights are meant to represent the entirety of mankind, they are 
nothing compared to the power commanded by God.  
 Religion helped the Russian government exclaim how the globalist ways of 
thinking are inherently wrong. In similar fashion to how the Soviet Union became its own 
atheistic religion, the Western ways of human rights have become labeled as a faith in an 
institution. This institution is labeled as the highest possible way of thinking in universal 
                                                 




Christ like ways of performing charity. “To be sure, humanists do not literally worship 
human rights, but [they] use the language to say that there is something inviolate about 
the dignity of each human being.” 58 But with the reinvigoration of the Russian church in 
the post-Soviet world, God has become the highest calling, these reformations have 
created new perspectives in the Russian world. “In these processes, certain versions of 
collective culture were constructed as ‘authentic’, others forgotten, constructed as 
‘deviant’, or relegated to ‘minorities’. This involved not just inventing new traditions, but 
also the fixing of previously more flexible and continually renewed traditions and the 
institutionalization both of biases and of powerful agents of cultural regulation.”59 Putin 
and the tools he is utilizing are each exclaimed as part of these new traditions that are 
built upon the ruins of the Soviet Union, both being of a similar institutionalized division 
between them and the West. Human rights have been vocalized by the Russian 
government as the religion of the West, something is viewed as wanting to delegitimize 
the significance the Orthodox church, another aspect of Russian culture.  
The Russian Court and Centralizing Power 
 The Russian governments use of strong nationalism as an aspect of Russian 
culture that has to stay is due to a recollection of historical significance that strong 
leaders have had throughout Russia’s history. Even with the West claiming Putin’s 
actions as self-interesting, there is a significance between a Russian and a Westerner 
when it comes to who is dictating laws in Russia. For the citizens of Russia an 
authoritarian presence that is Russian is still better than those Western democrats because 
it is at least a genuine Russian who is in charge. From a national identity standpoint, the 
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country is still in control of its own sovereignty. There is a preservation of the Russian 
government for the Russian, even if it is one that is corrupt, it is still identified as being 
Russian.  
 This corruption, where bias has been performed in order to propel some sort of 
power, has become clearly visible in the Russian court system, which Putin has used to 
his advantage. The court has found itself becoming another functionary tool of the 
nationalistic power structure in order to centralize all conventional power structures. Due 
to its use by the government it has become a way that the Russian state can extent its 
control over the population in order to help stability in Russia, which is coincidently his 
grasp on power. Putin wants to emphasize his strength as a symbolic representation for 
the strength of the state. The purpose of this strength is supposed to be seen as preserving 
the greater good, which is considered the sovereignty of Russian power in Putin’s eyes. 
For the Russian government, control over the courts is considered just another necessity 
in order to fight Western influence.  
 When Putin reacts against Western influence in these certain institutions of power 
the Russian government’s insecurity over power is revealed. For Putin to guarantee 
nationalism under his domain, he needs to make sure there is no potential for someone 
else to gain relative power in Russia. NGOs who are trying to establish real justice would 
inadvertently take power away from Putin. Even if it was no their purpose the Russian 
administration is convinced that if an organization of some type is not associated with 
Putin, then they must have intentions that are contrived to Putin’s own. If a movement of 
some type is to be involved in a Russian situation, they Putin wants that organization to 




organization called Pravovaia Osnova (a Legal Foundation) is a perfect example of a 
group that opposes a Russian area of thought, the prison system. The NGO was created 
with a mission to assist the lives of prisoners in Russia who live in horrid conditions. 
Since this organization has questioned the status quo of a Russian institution, it has been 
labeled as a Western accomplice. “Larisa Zakharova, a member of Pravovaia Osnova, 
told Amnesty International that when the decision was made to classify the organization 
as a “foreign agent”, they were told that providing free legal aid, complaining against 
officials, taking cases to court to challenge unlawful regulations was political activity 
aimed at changing government’s policy.”60 This political response to Pravovaia Osnova 
was more than just directed at that one NGO, it was a warning to human rights affiliates 
of any type. The only people who are meant to change how a part of Russia works is the 
Russian government, and they will use all their power to make sure it stays that way. 
Putin’s Court 
 The judicial court’s connection to the nation has been one that has been revived 
from the Soviet time period when the court was just an extension of the State. The State’s 
will is legally dictated through the justice system. In order to be legally recognized the 
Russian state has to twist how the legal system works in order to perceived as following 
the international realms respect for the legal system. With this illusion, the court has 
become utilized in the similar authoritarian fashion to the past, the only difference is that 
now the purpose is to preserve Putin’s Russian identity, rather than an ideological State. 
In the Soviet time “it was the prosecutor’s job to present the state’s position, which 
amounted to creating a legal pretext for jailing people for exercising rights guaranteed to 
                                                 




them by the Soviet constitution.”61 The most famous trial that the Russian administration 
utilized to acknowledge their personal power in the face of rebellion was the trial of three 
members of the protest-punk band Pussy Riot. They were convicted for acts of 
hooliganism which resulted in two years in prison because they performed a “punk 
prayer” which denounced Putin and his affiliation with the Church in the Christ the 
Savior cathedral which is in close proximity to the Kremlin. But while this is the most 
public examples of the current Russian administration flexing their judicial muscles, this 
utilization of the court has been wide spread throughout the 21st century. Businessmen 
especially have become victims if they have decided not to align themselves under 
Putin’s dominance as a continuation of rounding up the oligarchs in the early years of 
Putin’s time as president. 
 Putin’s representation as being an embodiment of the majority’s will mean that he 
has no faults as an individual because they majority voice has formulated a democracy. 
Putin’s only duty is to run that democracy as a strong and independent being, being the 
type of authority that the Russian majority wants in their president. His perfection as a 
leader is due to the fact that he is no viewed as an individual, but just as the brain that 
pushes the different arms of the Russian identity. With the Russian identity being 
represented in all these different ways and with different institutions, the government can 
encapsulate practically every part of an individual’s life. The majority population feels 
like they are being completely represented, therefore this regime is the only one they 
think they would ever need. “What the populist specifically does is to say, "Because I 
                                                 




didn't win, the system is rigged." And that in a democracy is not an acceptable 
argument.”62  
 Putin’s morals are applied into the Russian beliefs. There is an obvious 
connection to be made between nationalism, that is attempting to determine the future of 
the State, and an alignment with heavenly pre-destination, determined by the Church. The 
Holy Patriarch becomes another authoritarian unit which still represents one aspect of 
cultural significance of the Russian nation. This allows the actions of Putin to be 
recognized and respect by another institution that is supposed to be independent of the 
State. Of course, this is not the actual case, due to the close relationship of higher 
members of the Orthodox church and Putin. But the illusion of choice creates a 
unification between these different establishments, which are supposed to be thinking 
independently, which both cohabitate the realm of proper Russian organizations. This 
allows the actions of the Russian government to be seen as morally correct in opposition 
of people who might disagree. Those people who oppose the Russian government are 
seen as lacking morals themselves, being viewed as degenerates rather than just differing 
opinions from the status quo. This basis has cultural reasoning that is understood from a 
fundamentally Western perspective. Due to the fact that Russian powers are utilizing 
institutions that are culturally significant to them, the West has no ability to interfere with 
these power structures on the basis of cultural tolerance.  
Psychiatry Being an International Legitimization  
 But the Russian government does not just use exclusively Russian tools in order 
to solidify their authoritarian agendas. They have also utilized psychiatry, an 
                                                 




internationally respected field of medicine, in order to create evidence to why the Russian 
government has to be so rigid in the way it controls the nation of Russia. It is so effective 
because the study itself is widely respected by Western states and therefore is legitimized. 
Even if it is obvious that the Russian state is twisting psychological interpretations of the 
mental stability of individuals, the West cannot comment on it. If the West would attempt 
to react to how psychology is being used in Russia, then the Russian government would 
simply turn that question back onto Western powers, each of which interprets psychology 
a little bit differently, resulting in the West being humiliated. “The dominance of certain 
scientific paradigms (e.g. in which psychiatry is exclusively a medical, neurobiological 
discipline) with the accompanying vocabulary (subversive views are symptoms of a 
mental disorder) and treatment goals (disciplining and “adjusting” the victim to the 
prevailing political discourse) make it very difficult to have an alternative approach.”63 
This study allows an internationally accepted way of analyzing individuals become just 
another tool utilized by Russia to push its agenda in a world of globalizing human rights. 
This world tries to give justice to those that are unjustly accused, such as the 
marginalized individuals that do not fit Putin’s Russian identity. But the West cannot give 
an alternate answer that would make Putin’s accusations that utilize psychology void.  
 The Russian’s way of utilizing psychology is controversial because it labels an 
individual as mentally unstable in their reasoning behind their dissident actions. The 
members of Pussy Riot who were tried became victims of this classification, becoming 
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examples of individuals who are completely opposed to Putin’s nationalistic ideas.64 The 
reaction of the Russian government to Pussy Riots “punk prayer” are a perfect example 
of how the Russian government wants the Russian identity to be identified as a certain 
type of individual. Even with the international coverage that the case received, it just 
emphasized the power that Putin wanted display to the world, he and his regime have the 
power to determine people’s fates in Russia, and the world has no influence on them.65 
The trial of the Pussy Riot band members was just to set an example for what will happen 
to those who wish to openly defy the power structure that Putin has set for the population.  
 From the perspective of the West, Pussy Riot is not viewed as a controversial 
band. They sing about what they think is wrong with the society that they inhabit; this 
society being completely controlled by the presence of Putin. But in populist Russia a 
band like Pussy Riot cannot exist because their public presence makes Putin’s symbolic 
representation of the people void. Due to the fact that Pussy Riot has tried their best to 
make their voices as public as possible, they are publicly announcing that Putin’s voice 
does not accurately represent ever Russian citizens. Pussy Riot’s technique has been to 
turn what was before some average public place in Russia into a place where they could 
speak their opinions of all the crooked things that have been hidden away.66 This 
exposure of opinions that differ from the government is detrimental to the existence of 
Putin’s populist regime. Even the existence of a band such as Pussy Riot is damaging 
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because it reveals the fact that Putin and his administration are not fully capable to satisfy 
every Russian’s needs.  
 Putin’s response to the dissidence of Pussy Riot has been to label their actions as 
reactions for being mentally unstable. He has done this in order to say that the reasons for 
their actions are not directly linked to any fundamental problems of the State, but just 
being because of the individual’s mental disorders. Putin is using psychiatry to interpret 
the purpose of Pussy Riot’s actions as a result of individual issues. The supposed 
evidence of these mental disorders reject the meaning behind the music of Pussy Riot and 
the purpose of forming the band. Every action they had performed up to their 
imprisonment would have been viewed as absolutely pointless, it would all be considered 
fabrications from the minds of mentally unwell people. “[The psychiatrists hired by the 
court during the trial] had found [Pussy Riot] sane and fit for trial but had nonetheless 
diagnosed each with a personality disorder. Maria, they said, suffered from emotional 
distress brought on by her desire to protest. Nadya and Kat were both labeled with 
something called “mixed personality disorder.” Nadya’s symptoms were her “active 
position in life” and “heightened ambitions,” while Kat exhibited an abnormal “insistence 
on her own point of view.””67 While such supposed symptoms as “heightened ambitions” 
or “insistence on her own point of view” are laughably absurd to imagine in a court of 
law, the resulting factor that is so significant is how these young women are labeled. The 
government will utilize this case as a referral for future endeavors involving protesters, 
proving the unstable mental conditions of those protesting the Russian state. The 
                                                 




significance is that they refuse submit to Putin’s Russian identity because they are 
mentally unwell, rather than having opposing opinions.  
 With the court deciding to question the mental stability of protestors, rather than 
questioning the purpose for them protesting is an example of unquestioning loyalty to the 
Russian state. The court sees the State as a respected institution which doesn’t need to be 
scrutinized in comparison to those who question it. Below are the results verbatim of the 
Pussy Riot trial, and they tell two things. One: a definition of how somebody can be 
considered a dissident against the populist Russian state. Two: a warning against anybody 
who would be inspired by the actions of Pussy Riot.  
“The prosecutor read out the charges in rapid fire. Sometime before February 17, 
2012, Nadya had entered into conspiracy with Maria, Kat, “and other persons 
unknown to the investigators for the purpose of rudely disrupting the social order 
in a manner that would express a clear lack of regard for societal norms, 
motivated by hatred and enmity, motivated by hatred for a particular social group, 
in the form of carrying out offensive actions inside a religious institution aimed at 
attracting the attention of a broad spectrum of citizen believers.” The conspirators 
had “distributed roles among themselves and purposefully acquired clothing to be 
worn, clothes that clearly contradicted church norms, discipline, rules, and 
regulations inside the church.” Being aware of the offensiveness of their attire “to 
the entire Russian Orthodox world” and “the criminality of their intent and the 
scale of the insult they planned to inflict,” they used balaclavas to disguise their 
identities and thus make it more difficult for them to be charged. “This increases 




intent, meant to denigrate the feelings and beliefs of the numerous disciples of the 
Orthodox faith and diminish the spiritual foundation of the state.””68 
 Under the guise of rigid scientific definitions of how certain things are, ranging 
from juridical laws to psychiatry, the court has bent the reasoning behind how somebody 
can be tried under these supposedly factual definitions. The Church and the court have 
legitimized the State by acting as though they are independently controlled institutions. 
But they actually submit to Putin’s Russia, declaring it as the highest point of power in 
the Russian nation and therefore should be respected as such. With these illusions, Putin 
has centralized more than just the Russian government. He can have domain over all 
aspects of the proper Russian life, the Russian identity he has approved of. The success 
behind the government’s political abuse of psychiatry is built upon these organizations 
that Putin has amassed under his control. While the court dictates public law, the Church 
dictates public order. Since these two sides are under control of the anti-Western 
government, human rights organizations with Western origins discover that it is 
incredibly difficult to become grounded in Russian society. From either a literal or 
figurative standpoint Russian nationalism is already so deeply entrenched in the 
populace, while at the same time rejecting anything West as being detrimental to Russia’s 
preservation as an identity.  
The Fragility of Putin’s Russian Identity 
 With the Russian population facing a world of tolerance and acceptance of 
different types of individuals, the Orthodox church becomes an essential way for the 
Russian identity to comprehend its own presence, and how a proper Russian citizen 
                                                 




should be. It supplies a guide for the citizens on which it lays claim of how a member of a 
society should be and how they should be representing themselves. The Church is the 
moral backbone of Russia, and upon the church is the influence of Putin, which has 
encouraged the acts of conformity and obedience under nationalistic pride. While the 
actions of Pussy Riot do not seem that intense from a physical perspective, no one was 
harmed during or after (excluding the band members who were detained, becoming 
malnourished and dehydrated) the protest song was performed, but it still had a powerful 
impact on the structural stability of the Russian identity. Due to the purpose behind the 
band’s actions that are questioning and therefore damaging the idea behind Putin’s 
exclusive Russian identity and reveal’s the sensitivity of the populist identity. Exposure 
of nonconforming thoughts is a powerfully dangerous action on its own because Putin 
has done everything he can to minimize alternative ways of living. Deviating from the 
Russian government’s interpretation of what a good citizen is can create an impact that 
influences those around the dissident individual, then Putin loses ultimate control of 
Russia.  
 This fragility in the stability of Putin’s power seems to be on the verge of collapse 
at any moment, but fortunately Putin has a powerful ally to secure his strength: the 
majority population. What keeps Putin afloat and stops Russia from progressing as a 
nation is the belief that Putin’s actions are for the people by the people. Putin as an 
individual is to be viewed simply as the mediator between the desires of the majority and 
the change they want to see in the nation. Putin has emphasized that for this nation to be 
kept under the control of the populace, then stability and the grounding actions that 




centralization. But in this realm of stability there is no potential for improvements in how 
the people actually identify themselves, rather than just following the structure that the 
government has laid out for them. The citizens of Russia, the majority of Russians at least 
do not have an active part in deciding what determines their identity. Progression has to 
exist in a system of development over the course of time, with it being a given that there 
is the possibility for risk and failure. But the Russian media has responded by fear 
mongering and creating a general sense of paranoia among the citizens. The comfort in 
the security that the government provides those that conform has become easier for the 
majority of the populace, rather than risking their lives for the idea of something better.  
Conformity against New Ways of Thinking 
 Progressive ideas, such as the ones human rights want to promote, can only be at 
their maximum potential if some type of authority, which the population respects, 
approves of the intentions behind those ideas. New ways of thinking about the rights of 
an individual such as gender norms are contrary to Russian traditions and their structures. 
Therefore, these ways of thinking about rights are considered contrary to the Russian 
identity. “In 2012, in discussion of a proposed “gender equality” law, a prominent Church 
spokesman, archpriest Dmitri Smirnov, equated use of the term “gender” with betraying 
the country’s interests and (according to a summary of his remarks on a Russian feminist 
website) “affirmed that people’s right to define their gender roles for themselves would 
lead to a ‘blow to the birthrate’ and the destruction of the institution of the family.””69 
Western human rights would not just be contrary to Russian thinking and Russian 
identity, but they would be fundamentally detrimental for the continuation of the Russian 
                                                 




people. This idea that for an individual to acknowledge the goodness that human rights 
could potentially bring to the Russian population is immediately rejected. Due to the 
well-respected authorities that surround the life of a Russian citizen and continually 
denounce human rights, he or she is intensely pressured into following suit. 
 Human rights become the juxtaposition to the survival of the Russian identity 
defined by the authorities of Russia. Uniformity, what the Russian government claims to 
be an essential part of the nation’s stability, is broken down by human rights. Human 
rights are supposed to be for the individual and define the individual, therefore Russia has 
made the distinction that human rights would break up the nation. In their mind the 
results would be a nation full of citizens that define themselves not as Russian, but as 
something else. The nationalistic strength, that brazen pride in the Russian identity versus 
the West would become an insignificant trifle and Putin would lose support for his 
authoritarian actions. Putin wants Russia to be similar to “the Bolsheviks’ gender policy 
[which] was about the straightforward acknowledgement of equality between men and 
women”70 with the continuation of stereotypical gender roles. People’s roles in Putin’s 
Russia should be identified as Russians, in his mind that is the only identity they need in 
order to succeed.  
Centralization of Media  
 In order for Putin to convey his message successfully to the citizens of Russia, 
defining what traits they should have as Russian citizens, the government has slowly 
taken over the media. This control of the media does two things that help continue to 
support nationalism and its authoritarian reign. First it allows Putin’s view to be directed 
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at the citizen without the opinions that an independently controlled news media would 
convey. Secondly it cuts off any opinions that might oppose the president and his 
affiliates. The nationalistic message for unity against the West is conveyed to the 
populace exactly the way Putin wants it to be told. A perfect way to summarize how 
Putin views and treats the media was said by the man himself, who was explaining his 
perception of the media to Alexey Venediktov, the editor in chief of Echo of Moscow, 
the capital’s last independent radio station. “Here’s an owner, they have their own 
politics, and for them it’s an instrument. The government also is an owner and the media 
that belong to the government must carry out our instructions. And media that belong to 
private businessmen, they follow their orders. Look at [Rupert] Murdoch. Whatever he 
says, will be.”71 Putin looks at these different institutions inside of Russia as aspects of a 
business which he is the president of. While this is considered an improper way for a 
president to be as the leader of a democratic country, this is not how Putin wants to be 
viewed. His strength is in his unification of all aspects of Russian life, the media 
becoming a projection of the greatness behind Putin’s nationalism.  
 The media has become a funnel for the opinions of the Russian regime through 
multiple techniques, but an important one has been the State’s utilization of funds. The 
government has forced the media to accept a life line of cash in order for their news 
organization to stay afloat. They have cut Western connections to the Russian media, 
therefore if a news channel wants to stay afloat they must take money from the State, 
which of course gives implications of loyalty, similar to being part of the same business. 
For Putin to keep a guarantee on power the West has to be removed from any type of 
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news organization in Russia. In order to make this removal of Western influence 
successful he created a bill that was “quietly signed into law [in 2014 that] will limit 
foreign ownership of media assets to 20 percent by the beginning of 2017.”72  
So, with foreign influences removed, Putin only has to deal with wealthy 
organizations which might oppose him who are from inside Russia’s borders. 
Fortunately, with Putin’s control over the judicial system would-be investors are 
intimidated by just how influential Putin is over Russian laws. He can twist Russian laws 
in order to fit his interpretation. This is one such article of the Russian Criminal Code: 
“Article 319. Insult of a Representative of Power. Public insult of a representative 
of power during the discharge by him of his official duties, or in connection with 
their discharge, Shall be punishable with a fine in an amount of up to 40 thousand 
roubles, or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the 
convicted person for a period of up to three months, or by compulsory works for a 
term of 120 to 180 hours, or by corrective labour for a term of six to twelve 
months.”73 
Such an article is built upon a conceptual basis of honor and respect for the 
discharged official, something that is recognized by the international community to be 
Eastern in philosophical notions of respect. Therefore, it is respected by the West out of 
21st century notions of cultural acceptances of others while it can be utilized by Putin’s 
administration in order to place fear over members of the media.  
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But the fear of being imprisoned is the least of the media’s worries. Being able to 
even afford to publicize their news stories is the first issue for the media, and the Russian 
government gives them no space to speak differing opinions. In the mind of the populace 
government, to have opinions that contradict the government is to be anti-Russian and 
against the unification of the Russian identity. The Russian identity needs to be 
influenced exclusively by what the State believes in, and Putin has made sure of this by 
utilizing how public funds are used. “None of this is even to mention the extent to which 
Russian arts depend on state funding and cannot accept funding from certain nonprofit 
sources without accepting labels that might get them tagged as anti-Russian.”74 
Influential organizations, even if they are supposed to be voices of factual evidence, 
cannot exist in the Russian environment. If they want to exist they have to lose their 
independence and submit to say what the government wants them to say.  
Freedom and independence are viewed with a tinge of irony in Russia. While 
Putin determines the country to be a free nation due to the fact that the Western world has 
no influence over the Russian people, institutions and the individuals of Russia have to 
submit to the State. This is in order for there to be perfect unity under Putin, as though 
there is a necessity to be aligned to one person and put faith in that individual. Putin has 
created incentive though for people to submit to his strength, he has utilized his 
nationwide connections to reward submissive people who are willing to work the system 
in similar fashion. “By 2011, human-rights activists estimated that fully 15 percent of the 
Russian prison population was made up of entrepreneurs who had been thrown behind 
bars by well-connected competitors who used the court system to take over other 
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people’s businesses.”75 Putin simply wants there to be submission, and has convinced the 
country through the media that submission will create national strength in order to 
prevent influence from outside while solidifying the national identity. With loyalty to the 
Russian government “the integration of economies on a national level not only knitted 
together dispersed individuals and communities, it helped to define the unit of identity.”76 
Senses of communication and allegiance were not actually built through the communities 
of people, but upwards towards the authoritative units. There is no real unity being 
created between the people who actually are members of the Russian identity. But the 
media’s goal is to make sure this does not seem like the case, that on the contrary by the 
fact that the Russian government is powerful, then therefore is the unity of the Russian 
people.  
Putin’s News Outlet 
 But the ultimate example of Russian unity under Putin in the form of the media is 
a monopolizing news station called RT (Russia Today). Also, known as “the international 
arm of Russia’s state-run news network, RT, once known as Russia Today, is getting a 30 
percent funding bump in the proposed 2015 budget, and other state news outlets also are 
receiving injections of cash”77 This news network is Putin’s main media projector of the 
Russian state’s nationalism, even going beyond the borders of Russia. Its available not 
only in Russian but also English, Arabic, Spanish, German, and French, its domain is 
more than just propaganda for the citizens of Russia; its labeled as the opposition to 
Western news corporations, a view from the other side that claims to have been 
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marginalized against. It’s philosophy that has a lot in common with the conservative 
media of the USA, which believes that there is a majority media bias against them in 
favor of liberals, and therefore they must keep on declaring their decisive division from 
the liberal media.78 Through this conduit, Putin has delivered a completed definition of 
what Russia is and what it will be, with no space to add anything or take anything away 
from it. 
 RT tries to show its purpose as being something that is necessary in a world 
dominated by Western influences. There is a need to this decisive side to any news story 
in order to contradict the Western media and their biases. This news network is just a 
small part of the world that Putin controls, all of it being perceived as necessary against a 
looming Western threat supposedly marginalizes every aspect of Russian life. In similar 
fashion to how Putin twists interpretations in order for them to appeal to his agenda, he 
twists the news to seem as though his Russia has the upper hand. Take this example on 
how the Kremlin is viewed: “this admission [of Russia] blew the cover off of Obama’s 
greatest deception, the US-Russia reset hoax.”79 Putin’s Russian identity needs to be seen 
as a unified people that are on the winning side of any battle, regardless of how factual 
the battle is.  
The Potential for the Coexistence of Nationalism and Human Rights 
 The identity of Russia that Putin is placing on the forefront and the tools he has 
used to keep him under the government’s submission has made sure there is no space for 
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human rights to be involved. Putin has made sure to politicize the entirety of Russian 
sociological culture and every aspect the individual citizen lives in. Putin has made 
Russia to appear as a democracy in which the citizen’s voices are heard, but it is just 
Putin who is heard. His restrictions have allowed the Western world to be slandered and 
demonized, building up the Russian state’s role to be something that is completely 
necessary for Russian culture to survive. Russian political legitimacy is when “our 
choices [as the citizens of the nation] are constrained by the dominating paradigms of 
discourse and action in which we are immersed.”80 Putin’s government, and all the 
powerful institutions underneath control the realm of discourse and the subjects that are 
allowed to be exposed to the public.  
This exclusivity of influence does not mean that human rights will never find a 
place in Russia, it just means that if human rights are to find a place in Russia and 
become something more than a stigma of foreign ideas, they must be made in Russia, not 
brought to it. Even if human rights have been heavily advocated in the West in 
comparison to the East, this is only because those specific organizations there are imbued 
with Western traditions of culture and thought. Russian’s have their own strong cultural 
sentiments that can be easily rectified with human rights lingo. “In such a future [(where 
the East understands the universality of human rights)], shared among equals, rights are 
no the universal credo of a global society, not a secular religion, but something much 
more limited and yet just as valuable: the shared vocabulary from which our arguments 
can begin, and the bare human minimum from which differing ideas of human flourishing 
can take root.”81 The West’s definition of human rights is one that is symbolized by such 
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terms as universalization and globalization, terms that define themselves by wanting to 
represent humanity in its whole. Putin has twisted this definition around though, and has 
made the argument that the West’s desire for universalization of human rights is focusing 
on giving the West cultural superiority, bulldozing opposing ways of cultural thinking. 
For human rights to truly be properly accepted by skewed perspective of Russia it must 
be taken up by the Russian people. Xenophobia has crippled foreign organization who 
have attempted to bring human rights to Russia. Being an outsider tags them as culturally 
different and therefore detrimental to Russian society because they are looked at as 
attempting to change Russia to reflect their own societies. Human rights can be Russian, 



















Hope and Belief in the Double-Headed Eagle: Human Rights of Russia 
“The core, the binding fabric of this unique civilization – is the Russian people, Russian 
culture. This is the cultural code that has, in the recent years, been subject to some serious 
trials, which people have tried and continue to try to break. And it has, nevertheless, 
prevailed. At the same time, it needs to be nourished, strengthened, and protected.”82 
-Vladimir Putin 
Grassroots Organizations in an Apolitical Russia 
The people of Russia have had a dramatic change in perspective depending on 
what time period in history they had lived through, for those born around 1990, they have 
only seen the modern-day Russia, one that is supposed to be democratic, equal in its 
contemporary values to any other first world nation. But its identity lies on a fragile 
surface of paranoia, one that Putin wants to reinforce with aggressive revisionists ideals 
that assert its own superiority by its defiance against the West. The results have been 
disastrous and have only brought Russia down a rabbit hole consisting of illusions of 
grandeur which resemble the Soviet Union in its pre-perestroika days. An authoritarian 
regime does not improve the country its governing. Only the people who make up that 
country can improve their country by properly representing a nation and its culture. But 
“how do ordinary people become activists in an apolitical society?”83 The answer is to 
work within the apolitical system of Russia. Grassroots movements must be created 
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entirely from cultural and financial resources that lay inside of the country. If there is 
ever a bit of suspicion that an influence of some type has come from outside the country 
then Putin or one of his cohorts will automatically claim that the organization is a 
Western tool, invading Russia in order to further its own agenda, resulting in the further 
damaging of the Russian nation.  
 While chapter two explained the reasoning to why and how Putin used certain 
tools in order to eliminate other voices rather than his own (or those of his choosing) to 
be spoken, there is a historical mirroring that Russia has with the modern day western 
world. During the Cold War the motives behind the actions of the Soviet Union 
resembled how the West currently acts, excluding the obvious ideological differences 
between capitalism and communism, the end goals, a world existing in harmony because 
of the influences that certain nations have. The only difference now is that while the 
Soviet Union and their dreams died off, such anti-Soviet organizations like NATO never 
dissolved once the Soviet Union declared its defeat. Russia gives the illusion that it is 
innumerably outnumbered by its enemies, who still have a vendetta against the nation, 
even though the Cold War in all official jargon has been long gone. “A crucial dimension 
of [understanding roles of smaller communities under the umbrella of something with a 
greater purpose] was the destruction of highly local crafts in favor of more nationally 
integrated occupational categories.”84 This can go beyond the nation though, for the 
Western world has been perceived by Putin as attempting to shape nations for the 
bettering of humanity in its whole. It’s what Putin’s propaganda machine considers to be 
the Western danger that Russians need to be aware of. The origin of this fear though is 
                                                 




one that has a bruised ego attached to it. The Soviet Union was once another one of these 
international organizations that believed that the greater good justifies the means behind 
their actions. Its opposition to the West and its organizations such as NATO are black and 
white, two ideologies that cannot cohabitate inside the same political State. The victory 
of the West and the liquidation of the Soviet Union created a reality that Putin declared to 
be the death of Russian culture through such tools like human rights.  
 With the previous paragraph in mind, if the people of Russia want to successfully 
integrate human rights into the Russian psyche it needs to have two important features to 
succeed: number one, it must be Russian in design and can be proven to help advance and 
preserve the national identity of Russia. Number two, it must still follow a human rights 
protocol that is inclusive to every group of peoples that do and could possibly inhabit 
Russia. Regardless of the unique (and by Putin’s philosophy, exclusive) nature of post-
Soviet Russia, there is a necessity for Russians to explain through actions demonstrating 
to their fellow citizens that human rights can be Russian while still sticking to the core 
nature of what human rights are supposed to represent. “In keeping with the idea that 
human rights can be defended on a plurality of grounds, [Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration] point[s] not to a single foundation for human rights but to several.”85 Human 
rights are not exclusively about the laws that they create and formulate, first they must be 
defined and agreed to by the people they are supposed to represent. Therefore, rights 
don’t define the people they represent, but rather the people define rights. This 
foundation determines just how successful the true impact is. The influence that creates 
                                                 




an improvement for a community in its entirety rather than improving the lives of a 
selected few requires representatives of every voice.  
The Importance of the Citizen’s Participation in Relation to Political Power 
Russia considers its strength to lie upon its solidarity in defiance, defiance against 
outsider influence and defiance against outsider voices, resulting in solely defining its 
nationhood. There is a necessity for the population to become its own voice, properly 
representing themselves in the nation of their birth. The relevance of the citizen’s voice in 
comparison to the other, the foreigner, has been a respected opinion in the ideology of 
Russia even in the courts of the Soviet era. “By Russian law, a witness or victim of an 
alleged crime can testify only to the facts; witness opinions must be disallowed when 
offered and must never be solicited. But those who testified as witnesses against Soviet 
dissidents were often asked to render their opinions on the anti-Soviet nature of actions or 
materials attributed to defendants-and their opinions, scripted by the KGB, often made it 
into the wording of the courts’ verdicts.”86 Phrasal usage has always been essential in 
influencing legal structures such as politics or the court of law, being used to shift the 
influential power that facts would presumably have over such legal institutions.  
Putin once said that “a person without a country must therefore be understood to 
lack not only a place in the external world but a proper self.”87 He is arguing that Russia 
is trying to be taken from the Russian people by the globalists through tools such as 
human rights in order to reshape it, the result being a Russia reflecting the outsider 
influence of the West, rather than being influence from the inside, a Russia for Russians. 
A real Russia needs to preserve as much cultural heritage it can muster in a world where 
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the West has decided how the world will stay stable against the risk of the rising of 
revisionist powers and how a revisionist power can be defined. The claim by Putin is that 
a person needs not a culture, but a well-controlled government that is able to dictate what 
is right or wrong in society, and therefore the culture that society represents.  
But Putin’s accusations against human rights and its globalist arms, ones that are 
taking Russia from its people are not just improbable but also hypocritical due to his 
administration’s own actions since the turn of the millennia. “Though nationalist self-
descriptions generally emphasize mass participation and cross-class unity, for example, 
nationalism is often an elite project structured in ways which maintain or institute 
patterns of domination.”88 This is why the interference of official protests (those that are 
pre-approved by the government and therefore deemed official) are just not enough, the 
exposure of the problems not to become entangled into the system that Putin has created, 
basically twisting a system that he has already twisted.  
Rediscovering the Public Sphere (and what happened to it?) 
But before Russians are able to ornament human rights with their own cultural 
significances they first must be aware of the control that a group of citizens can have with 
enough will power and knowledge. The authoritarian nature of Putin’s administration and 
of past authorities are very relevant to the lives of Russian citizens due to their prevalent 
nature throughout Russian times. It is a necessity that this realization is achieved in order 
for the populace to gain a voice that is coming from somebody who is not a state 
politician in order to encourage a diversity of voices that represent more than the 
supposed unified whole that Putin represents. One example of the power of grassroots 
                                                 




movements in Russia was the realization of the power of the people with a utilization of 
unions, which previously had a reputation in the early 2000s to be weak and practically 
ineffective against management. Alexei Etmanov, a union worker explained that: “with 
my comrades, we have taught them [their fellow workers] to use the union as a weapon 
of struggle and to say “we” when they are talking about the union.”89 Structures have 
always been known to be represented at the State level and represented by the State, Putin 
wanted to emphasize this.  
Putin’s desired results of the Russian state are a country in which the citizens see 
their participation to be simply futile, resulting in a narcissistic attitude against the 
concept of change at the level of the citizens. Not only would these desired results give 
the public the illusion that their political participation is worthless, but it would also 
continually reinforce the superiority of those in power and their ability to create real 
change to the State and its structures. This evokes the prideful emotions of unity inside 
the Soviet Union that proceeded the revolution up to the victory of World War 2 (the 
generation born after this was the first real dissident generation), a bond of teamwork that 
requires the participation of population. “The problem with Russia, however, was that the 
huge country was as atomized as it had ever been. Putin’s policies had effectively 
destroyed public space.”90 In Putin’s era the ideologies of the early Soviet Union have 
been turned and twisted around in order to promote authoritarian motives. “Individuals 
only become persons in social relationships that are already shaped by culture.”91 
Whether it’s the State’s propaganda through the radio, or a local citizen on a soap box 
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speaking from one citizen to another, a speech focusing on the influential power that a 
community has given the listener an awareness to his responsibility, depending on the 
message of the speech.  
Throughout every historical period of Russia, from the imperial age of the tsars up 
till the 1990’s, the notion of representation and ownership went hand in hand, if you were 
to own (or in Soviet times, to direct) a factory your voice was the voice of sovereignty, 
workers could not expect to get something good if they were to protest. Only in the 21st 
century has the consolidation of power has finally been seen as unnatural and 
unnecessary. Physical spaces have become more than a representation for an ideology, or 
an individual and their power, now it is about a unique group of peoples that exists inside 
a unique location and have a unique profession. “The appropriation of common places 
played a role in mobilisation. These included physical spaces in the workplace and the 
words and ideas linked to the workers’ movement. Union activists achieved a visible 
presence on the shop floor by putting up posters throughout the factory and distributing 
leaflets.”92 Representation does not have to be something that is universal in theory and 
practice as it had been in both the Soviet and Imperial times. Different groups of people 
represent different ways of life and how to live that life, but regardless of these 
differences the best way for these people to be represented is for them to represent 
themselves.  
The Building of Big Changes from the Ground Up 
Many movements of gradual significance that have been occurring inside of 
Russia have gone unnoticed in the international sphere due to their relatively 
                                                 




uninteresting actions, especially when in comparison to groups such as Pussy Riot, who 
create a jarring romanization of rebellion against the conformist nature of the Russian 
state. But these little issues and how the people are dealing with them are noteworthy in 
understanding how long-term change can arise in the apolitical state of modern Russia. 
“Much thanks to the single largest demonstrations [that eventually arose] to have been 
organized in a middle-sized Russian city in recent years, with 12,000 taking to the street 
on 30 January 2010, the movement eventually resulted in the de facto dismissal of the 
sitting regional governor Georgy Boos. However, behind it lie more bread-and-butter 
type of issues that had sparked it in the first place, such as transport taxes, jobs, car 
import duties and utility bills.”93 These kinds of movements work so effectively in an 
authoritarian state such as Russia due to the fact that there is no way for an authority 
figure (who wishes to concentrate as much power as possible) to label those activities as 
being malignant against the sovereignty of the state.  
The miniscule nature of these movements that have occurred in Kaliningrad 
allowed these citizens to become aware about their own personal ability to create change 
in the political system. This a crucial necessity to encourage change in a nation. But at the 
same time, it is not perceived as an opposition to the standard quo that Putin emphasizes 
and encourages. As explained in chapter 2, any type of organization that makes the 
impression that they are existing as a contrasting force to Putin (and therefore the entirety 
of the political structure of Russia, as described in chapter 1) will immediately be labeled 
and prosecuted as having malevolent intentions against Russia in its entirety. Take for 
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example in 2005, when “police have detained Russian opposition leader and well-known 
Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny, who was handing out leaflets in the Moscow subway. 
Navalny was raising support for an anti-government rally. According to a police 
spokesperson, the pair [Navalny and one of his associates] was detained "for attempting 
to cause a public disturbance."”94 Alexei Navalny and his associate were simply 
attempting to help spread awareness of a type of power that the simple citizen has, the 
power that arises in numbers. But this is too open in questioning the current 
establishment’s reign of power to last before being considered detrimental to the Russian 
way of life. So therefore, the changes start in the Russian way of life, not creating 
revolutionary changes filled with unpredictability and violence, but awareness and 
improvements for the greater populace.   
This momentum, starting from little incidents and eventually resulting in the 
removal of a local politician have the possibility of going even higher in their influence 
and improvement for the local citizens. Much of the influence over who is elected in local 
states (and who even gets to be on the ballot) comes from the Duma, the lower legislative 
house of the Russian federation, which in turn is heavily dominated by Putin’s influence. 
“In the past, seats were allocated only from countrywide party lists according to the 
parties’ share of the popular vote. Now, voters elect part of the deputies directly — the 
candidate who gets the most votes in a certain district wins that district. Three “systemic” 
opposition parties represented in the State Duma almost always vote in favour of 
Kremlin-proposed legislation — an arrangement set to be continued through the 
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upcoming elections.”95 There are many struggles that go in for those at the bottom 
(civilians who begin by focused at the local sphere, the sphere that is directly related to 
their personal lives) have to go through to gain any influence over structural change. Due 
to Russia’s apolitical nature, if citizens first declare their disgruntled opinions, resulting 
in significant claims, nothing good will come of it due to Putin’s inherent power. “In fact, 
judging from the Kaliningrad case considered, one might even go as far as to claim that 
such a process of scale shift, or movement spread [in Russia], only becomes possible 
when there is no definite departure from local settings and ordinary concerns.”96 The 
momentum that the citizens gain with every achievement results in a slow amass of 
power that could almost be seen as a type of salami slicing. As long as the people slowly 
gain power through re-discovering their rights, the government can’t label them as a 
potential menace to their balancing act of society under their regime.  
Putin’s political representation was meant to be interpreted as much more than 
just embodying the political sphere, it means to denote the proper authority to all places 
of life inside of Russia. But with the emergence of these grassroots groups, authoritarian 
power is being dispersed and taken by others. The societal improvement lies in the fact 
that these people who make up the organizations are the ones who actually know what is 
going on in their field of knowledge. These citizens know what should and shouldn’t be 
done in these special institutions and how they can be improved over a long period of 
time. “Doctors and patients of the so-called Fishermen’s Hospital in the city of 
Kaliningrad (Medical Unit No. 1, previously reserved for employees of the fishing 
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industry), which had been slated for closure, began to mobilize towards the end of 2008. 
This campaign to save the hospital (which, besides picket lines, also consisted of media 
interventions, petitions, lobbying and parliamentary pressure) eventually transformed 
itself into a movement addressing broader public-health issues in the region (specifically, 
the healthcare budget as well as healthcare quality and access, which had deteriorated 
following an earlier experimental pilot program in healthcare finance).”97 Specialists, if 
given the proper amount of power needed to accelerate their own fields of interest can 
dramatically help to improve their areas. The Putin administrations monopoly of power 
has damaged the local economies of Russia. Local organizations must retake control of 
their areas of expertise in order for progression to ensure. Putin’s power does not allow 
him to have knowledge of every individual region and every region different subsects and 
so on, responsibilities must be given to those who know these places, because they work 
and live in these places.  
Redefining the Portrait of the Orthodox Church  
Pussy Riot, the protest-art band, have always known that for Russia’s general 
public to be aware that human rights can be Russian, Russian’s have to be the ones to 
make their fellow citizens aware of that fact. While they are anything but subtle with their 
messages against the current regime and its agenda, they still are an example of proper 
representation of real Russian culture while also supporting marginalized communities 
that the dominating population have considered to be naturally un-Russian, such as 
feminists and the homosexual community. They have used attributes of not just their 
lives, but of other Russian citizens who would claim that they have nothing to do with 
                                                 





them, and that they have nothing in common. One example was when Pussy Riot claimed 
that “without securing the patriarch’s blessing, we dared in our performance to combine 
the visual images of Orthodox culture and the culture of protest, making intelligent 
people suspect that Orthodox culture may belong not only to the Russian Orthodox 
Church, the patriarch, and Putin: it can end up on the side of civil riot and the protest 
culture in Russia.”98 Putin, and with him the State’s cultural domination are proven here 
to not be fully successful due to Pussy Riot’s declaration. Culture can be embraced by 
anybody who has a proper understanding of what aesthetic features represent it and 
formulate a comprehension that multiple individuals can understand and agree upon. 
Seeing these similar images that have had solidified definitions for many years becoming 
something new (yet similar) help people garnish a level of comprehension that create 
flexibility, a flexibility to understand tolerance at a cultural level. 
Unfortunately, due to assumptions that have been inspired and influenced by 
Putin’s propaganda, Pussy Riot in its entirety has been labeled as anti-religious and anti-
Orthodox, confirmed by their punk protest in an Orthodox Church, but also influenced by 
uninformed Russian people who were previously unaware of what it meant to be in a 
punk rock group and were then informed by the domineering administration. The funding 
that the Russian political powers have enables them to twist the interpretations of 
people’s actions and even how Westerners perceive and comprehend these actions. “The 
Pussy Riot punk prayer consciously invokes the “Mother of God”—a key symbol in 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity—to chase away Putin, thus uniting religious, feminine 
iconography with political protest in a message intended to communicate, not merely to 
                                                 




provoke.”99 Pussy Riot’s actions are both good and bad when it comes to how effective 
their actions were in combating the governments monopoly on cultural influence and 
power in the long term. Even though they have attempted to show that such traditionally 
conservative institutions such as the Orthodox church are less rigid in interpretation than 
they are believed to be, the aggressive way it had been achieved resulted in mixed 
reactions, depending on the audience. For those (presumably) younger and more liberal 
people, they might look upon the protest as a creative nuisance, but the response being 
one completely unnecessary and there suspicious and authoritarian. But for those more 
conservative people, the protest helped cement in their biased opinions against liberal and 
so-called Westernized mindsets, mindsets that are degraded morally, proven by such 
absurd acts like the punk prayer. The punk prayer is filled with shock value, but you 
cannot shock people that already dislike you, you must try to persuade them with results, 
not just raw action. 
Combating the Aftermath of Terrorist Attacks 
The family and its symbolic representation has always been prevalent through 
Russian history, symbolizing wholesome unity and loyalty to blood, but Putin’s side isn’t 
the only one to utilize this icon, so have groups that are opposing him and calling for 
justice. The Beslan School Siege and the lack of honest information that was released 
after a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, was the scene of a hostage crisis by Chechen 
terrorists became the scene for mothers of the victims who wanted to find the truth and 
justice of what happened during the siege. In the age of international terrorism, protection 
and the security it promises has become one of Putin’s speaking points, “terrorist attacks 
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took place in Moscow [(, the heart of Russia,)] in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2010, 2011”100, so the significance of fearmongering has certainly not diminished with 
time. Throughout Putin’s time as president one of his promises has been the unity of 
Russia, and in this unity a power of protection against those who wish the Russian way of 
life harm. By covering up true facts about what really happened behind the closed doors 
of the school Putin wants to be looked upon as somebody who does not negotiate with 
terrorists, someone who will promise them only with counteractive violence. He wants to 
be the voice of absolute reason of Russia, yet this organization wants to embody to true 
purpose of reason, to find honest answers about what happened at the scene of a 
horrendous event that deeply affected those involved in this organization.  
Politicians and other officials have constantly given misinformation about the 
truth of what happened (ranging from how the siege occurred to the numbers of 
casualties) to “the Mothers of Beslan. They had been the driving force behind an effort to 
turn the ongoing trial of the single surviving hostage-taker into a full-fledged 
investigation of what happened at the school. Increasingly, they had come to believe that 
the responsibility for the deaths of their children lay with federal troops.”101 “Dozens of 
survivors [from the Beslan school siege] agree that the first explosion launched by 
Russian counterterrorism forces broke through the ceiling of the gym, causing the roof to 
collapse on the hostages who were sitting beneath it. The authorities, meanwhile, insist 
that the Russian military refrained from using heavy weapons until the survivors had left 
the school.”102 The Mothers of Beslan have been widely accepted because they represent 
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a sense of honest decency that victims deserve, but they are not only victims of a tragic 
event, but they are mothers. The sympathetic nature of the mother, the one who binds a 
family together embodies Russia not only religiously through the Holy Mother, but 
through even traditional gender norms and how they play out. While the husband is 
expected to leave the household in order to work at a job, the mother stays, cooking, 
cleaning, and making sure the children are being properly raised and are properly 
behaving. They are practically responsible for the potential future of Russia because of 
the power they hold inside of the household. The paternal figure might still represent the 
spokesperson for the family unit, he would not be able to contain this unit without the 
structural support that the mother supplies. The mother is a key component, and her 
organizational power represents true Russian citizens going after the justice that they 
deserve after bearing so much hardship.  
Not only are the Mothers of Beslan an excellent example of how rights can be 
gained in Russia from a representational perspective, how they began their movement is 
another aspect that defines them as being benign in their end goals. Involvement and 
questioning the honesty of the answers that the Russian government give have been 
labeled in the past as malicious in nature due to the fact that they are questioning in the 
first place, but the Mothers of Beslan are being involved they were forced into the 
situation and the tragedy that be felled their families. Ms. Sadakava, one of the mothers 
of the victims said that “the only politics we knew was to raise our children to be worthy, 
healthy and beautiful. You know, one of the other women was asked in an interview, 




extent that politics entered us.'”103 Since the siege of Beslan resulted in so many deaths 
and contrary opinions between the survivors themselves and politicians who are supposed 
to properly represent them that there was a responsibility to themselves to take back the 
factual knowledge of the siege. The distortion of factual information about the deaths that 
had severely traumatized these families was a reality that they could not accept, Putin’s 
façade is limiting in how they can shape reality. The death of one’s child needs to be 
called for, the Mothers of Beslan knew (due to surviving hostages that were inside the 
school building during the siege) that Putin writing off the whole setup on exclusively the 
fault of Chechen terrorists is unacceptable.  
Eventually somebody in the Russian government must be held accountable for 
what happened and the dishonesty in the aftermath. “The Beslan Mothers Committee 
scored a victory of sorts [one] week when Alexander Dzasokhov, the head of the North 
Ossetia region that includes Beslan, resigned.”104 Even though the resignation of 
Dzasokhov (presumably one that was forced) was just an attempt to give the Mothers of 
Beslan some sort of satisfaction, it still shows how and why organizations such as these 
ones can find a place to reside and gain popularity inside of the Russian realm and gain 
rights that they deserve. “To confuse rights with aspirations, and rights conventions with 
syncretic syntheses of world values, is to wish away the conflicts that define the very 
content of rights.”105 The current political structure that Putin wants to encourage is one 
of political pride and one built on reliance in the actions of the government, because of 
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this Putin must accept at least some of the minimal demands of the Mothers of Beslan, 
rather than flat out denying them and labeling them as enemies of the State. The Mothers 
of Beslan have faced terrible circumstances, and Putin must deliver onto them some sort 
of justice, if not he is jeopardizing the promises of his nationalist creed and their 
legitimacy as honest truth.    
Mothers of Russian Soldiers 
The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia is one of the first successful 
organizations of local community activism to become representative of a group of 
individuals and the rights they properly deserve.  Even though they were organized and 
effective before Putin’s time in office (being created in 1989), they are a prime example 
of how rights can be given who are properly represented and understood as being a 
portion of Russian existence. The reason that this was one of the first successful 
organizations for rights is because of this representation; a strong military and the 
soldiers that make up the military have always been a point of pride in Russia, so there 
was a wide understanding by the populace when there was a demand for soldiers to have 
rights. Beforehand "the statistics [were] terrible: in times of peace, four to five thousand 
soldiers die[d] every year, without counting those participating in military actions. Cold, 
hunger, and the absence of medicines are to blame. Also, and what is most terrible, young 
recruits are subjected to maltreatment and torture by older soldiers and officers.”106 Such 
figures are not just embarrassing due to Russia’s claims to being a superpower, but due to 
their reliance on their military for the sake of a strong national security. If Russia is to 
live up to its promises as a country that can be defined by its own rules in a post-Soviet 
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world, citizen participation such as this is a necessity in order to adapt and progress as a 
country.  
The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was unique Russian not because they 
focused on soldiers, but because of the harrowing respect that the committee wished to 
give those who but their lives on the line for their country. It was not just about making 
the soldiers’ lives more comfortable, it was making sure that the profession would be 
kept and considered to be honorable, even with so many horrid events happening in the 
Chechnya war at the time. One massive influence was the desire for mothers to find their 
sons who have presumably passed away, some even going so far as to travel all the way 
to war-torn Chechnya in order to find them. On “25 September 1999: The first official 
burial of unidentified remnants of military men killed in Chechnya from Laboratory 
number 124, in the city of Rostov-on-Don, took place at the Bogorodskoy cemetery in the 
Moscow region.”107 Eventually this event of burying the remnants of soldiers became 
about soldiers in their entirety, beyond simply the mother’s disappeared son. 
Symbolically these mothers were there to honor these men not only as soldiers who had 
died for their country, but as mothers. There is a powerful representation in this act; the 
soldier’s country, which these men had sacrificed their lives to supposedly defend, has 
cast them aside, not even taking time to discover their names. But the mother, or the 
motherlike figure has come to sacrifice their own lives in order to bring a proper 
semblance of honor to the unknown soldier, who had died with no one and no country to 
honor him before he was found by the maternal figure. This motto and the actions that 
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come with it are ones that are unifying in respect, concepts that Russia considers to be 
part of the country’s internal structure. 
Even though the Chechen wars have come and gone, this organization has 
continued to be active members in their mission for people to be aware of the rights that 
soldiers have and deserve to have honored. “Since the establishment of the “Committee 
of Soldier's Mothers of Russia”, the organization has been engaged in educational activity 
in the sphere of protection of the rights of recruits, military men and their parents. In all 
regional branches of the organization, regular consultative-informative work at offices, 
educational institutions and military units is carried out.”108 It is important to have 
specific goals for such an organization, but the importance of education, especially in a 
society such as Russia is essential for continuing the spread of rights, and even the 
awareness of said rights. Another important aspect is that these specific rights are a good 
way to introduce the public to the concept of universal rights because who these rights 
specifically focus on, the soldiers in the military. Due to the patriotic strength that Russia 
prides itself on, they want to have soldiers that constitutional rights because they 
appreciate the soldiers for the sacrifice they had made, universal respect for a group helps 
peoples understand why human beings deserve to have rights and what greatness these 
rights do in both the long term and the short term.    
Going Beyond the Specifics: Unifying Groups of People 
With each group focusing on a singular topic, there is eventually a time when 
organizations need to utilize their momentum to join up with other groups who have also 
been successful in their won fields of expertise. The reason that these groups should have 
                                                 




been previously successful is not just for the sake of having advocating experience, but 
by having been legitimized by the apolitical society of Russia. “This convergence process 
came about not simply as the result of the bridging work carried out by leaders; it was, to 
at least an equal degree, a product of communicational dynamics among ordinary 
activists as well. In addition, what is also important to point out is that all this increase in 
generality and commonality in the course of the Kaliningrad movement formation was 
not exclusively brought about through some strategic calculation.”109 The experience of 
mobilization and the rewards that come from it, the satisfaction of finding of group of so-
called regular people being like-minded and the reality that by working together they can 
actually achieve the goals they set out to accomplish. These grassroots differ in 
organizational power in comparison to politically controlled organizations because of the 
significance of the common man and their role in the bigger picture. Rather than being 
just another number to add on to a statistic, such as those who participate in Russia 
United rallies, their participation includes real involvement in order to keep their 
movements afloat. The symbolic power this holds has the potential to be incredibly 
charismatic for those who have peak an interest in the mobilization, if they are to join 
they will not just be part of something bigger than them, but they will have a real purpose 
being part of the movement.  
Putin has not been able to label these groups as being enemies of the state not 
only because of their comparatively small and specialized focuses on specific areas of 
interest, but because they both support relatively similar doctrines. What multiple 
mobilized groups have in common are a sense of unity to work together in order to create 
                                                 




a prosperous Russia for the future, emphasizing features that are almost exactly the same 
as what Putin has promoted in his speeches. “What prevailed and continues to prevail, 
despite some divergences, is a common aspiration for unity and fraternity, in which all 
express the same courage and dignity by going down to the street and publicly affirming 
their right to be respected as citizens. Overall, the movement avoids political, social, and 
ideological division, and presents itself as a movement determined to ensure that “the 
state” (understood in fairly monolithic terms) recognizes “citizenship” and “citizens.””110 
The commonality of unification has been heavily dominated in Putin’s philosophy about 
how nationalism will make Russia develop a powerful national identity. The difference 
that divides these two groups though is how power is represented and therefore who is 
supposed to have it. Putin’s emphasis is on unquestioning trust in the actions of the 
government with the promise of long term prosperity in reward. These grassroots 
organizations though have ideas that align much more heavily with the promises that 
nationalism derives its significance off of. While Putin is trying to establish a Russian 
identity that is derived from hard-lined historical traditions, the local organizations are 
establishing a Russian identity based off of the actual people who live and represent 
Russia, regardless of cultural relevance.   
Even though we have seen that Putin’s relationship with the real citizens of 
Russia is one of a factitious nature, there is still the formidable position that Putin plays 
in the question of how he is dealt with when rights for the common man are being 
applied, and the answer is that he isn’t. Due to the nature of Putin’s structure, his personal 
protection is the top priority, but fortunately the way Putin has marketed his personality 
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has allowed him to become a symbolically bigger target than just as the president of a 
country, he has embodied more than just his professional position. “As for Putin himself, 
his role strikes me as inessential: slogans demanding his resignation were rare and 
brandished primarily by the movement’s leaders. “Anti-Putin” sentiment mostly reflected 
the rejection of the political system he represents (first, the “power ladder,” which refers 
to the absolute subordination of civil servants and political officials to their superiors, in 
which the public and voters count for naught).”111 The tools that Putin has used to absorb 
the entirety of the Russian government and all the responsibilities that come along with it 
can and have been utilized against him. It is not that he has simply bitten off more than he 
can chew, but it is the fact that there is no proper way for a country to progress with so 
much power to be concentrated at the top.  
The oversaturation of power is especially visible in Russia considering the 
geographic scale that the government has to deal with. In similar relations to Americans 
living in the Rust Belt, many Russians who do not live in the major cities such as 
Moscow or Saint Petersburg have been swept aside. “Most Russians live in housing built 
in the late Soviet period. A report released last year by the Russian Union of Engineers 
found that 20 percent of city dwellings lack hot water, 12 percent have no central heating 
and 10 percent no indoor plumbing. Gas leaks, explosions and heating breakdowns 
happen with increasing frequency, but in most places infrastructure is simply edging 
quietly toward collapse.”112 The administrations lack of actions to help areas that are not 
the major cities has been noticed by the locals, who wish to act to their own accord due to 
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the fact that they know best, because they live there, it’s their lives that are in these 
predicaments. The representation of the State has become something literally embodied 
in its geographic location, one that focuses on the major cities where the majority of 
citizens live in, including the major political players. Those that are outside of the 
peripheries of these politicians become invisible. A true sense of unity, a word Putin 
relies so heavily on for creating support, can only be completed if proper representation 
for every citizen is achieved. The political power that Putin gives to those in close 
proximity to himself must be spread out more widely to create politically active citizens 
that will further their own personal agendas for improving their situations.   
The Potential Future(s) of Mobilization in Russia 
 The continuation of grassroots movements requires multiple objectives in order to 
keep on expanding and gaining influence and spreading knowledge about the purpose of 
grassroots movements. One of these objectives is the necessary inclusion of indefinite 
end goals; once specific achievements have been completed, there is danger of the whole 
movement disappearing. “Another factor contributing to the demobilization of the 
movement [in Kaliningrad] was that some of the specific goals the movement had 
pursued in fact ended up being also achieved. The transport tax hike was revoked, for 
instance, and the legal right of kiosk owners to conduct business on municipal grounds 
was recognized; the regional health minister, for his part, resigned and, in the end, also 
the efforts to remove Governor Boos from office paid off.”113 All of the achievements 
that happened in Kaliningrad were great in the localized sphere, but the end goals were 
imagined to be exclusively labeled as the end of their necessary efforts as a movement. 
                                                 




The momentum that these movements have gained, the momentum that has been built up 
over successful periods of legitimization and recognition from their fellow citizens needs 
to continually exist in order to keep the momentum going, making the process of progress 
to become more and more significant.   
The unification of the populace of Russia, rather than just the idea populace of 
Russia that Putin wants to enact, would result in the real recreation of the Russian 
identity, rather than just some fabrication that is trying to be forced upon the world. Even 
if these organizations have completed their localized goals, there can be a continuation of 
work to do by spreading education about rights, and specifically explaining their 
significance due to the fact that these organizations have been successful in the past by 
claiming these rights. “Activists need to keep promoting the idea that citizens can no 
longer rely on the state to fix their problems; they need to keep fighting attempts by the 
government to smear them in the press and they must continue to encourage their fellow 
campaigner to local government positions, as three Khimki activists did successfully this 
September [of 2016].”114 Putin’s false promise that the Russian state will be 100 percent 
as a dependent support system. As statistics have proven over the years to not have 
become possible, sixteen years after Putin was first chosen as the president of Russia. 
With that discovery, there have been organizations that have worked to make changes 
happen in their community. There needs to be an emphasize on the fact that they worked 
for their community, rather than being some grandiose nationwide attempt at reformation, 
they started out small, in the places they have lived in, the places they knew better than 
the government that was supposed to represent them.   
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“Declining living standards, rising poverty, and the economic crisis are seen as far 
more troubling. In a society that has abandoned the democratic illusions and the rousing, 
abstract slogans about human rights that it embraced in the 1990s, these priorities are not 
terribly surprising. This is particularly true given that the public is largely unaware of this 
repression and that, in some instances, the latter is widely supported by public 
opinion.”115 Russia and its relationship to the authoritarian presence is one that can be 
described in the actions of a reluctant sigh and the shrug of one’s shoulders. It has always 
been this way in Russia, so for there to the potential of self-improvement requires more 
than a non-Russian exclaiming the greatness of self-realization and the power of claiming 
one’s rights. It requires the efforts of the citizens themselves, seeing that teamwork can 
become effective in order not propel a single being’s agenda, one that has been masked as 
being for every man, but an agenda that is actually for every man because it has been 
partially created with the help of the common man. People taken from different 
backgrounds, professions, and geographical locations, yet all living in the Russian 
Federation. This is how human rights can be successfully integrated into the Russian way 
of life, there must be a realization on the power of the people as a figure, rather than just 
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The Hope of a Broken People: Creating the Real Russian Identity 
 Putin’s populism is just one of the many ways that authoritarian leaders have tried 
to work in between two vantage points of political society: on one side is the tyrannical 
leader who will have to respond to military reactions from other nations or a civil war, on 
the other side there is the democratic leader who could not be labeled as authoritarian. 
Leaders such as Putin do all that they can to hold power within their means by making 
sure that human rights do not become part of the common vernacular of the population. 
Creating mythos and constructs about what a nation is have been crucial in order to 
legitimize the rejection of human rights as part of a nations sovereignty. But this is 
simply not how someone can define the conceptualization of human rights, and the 
citizens of Russia have been vocal about their awareness of this.  
 If the population of Russia is to really grasp the meaning of its unified identity as 
a nation, then conceptualizing their rights as individuals is an essential part to it. This 
would result in the creation of a population that can represent itself and can accurately 
shape its identity to be a reflection of the actual citizens that exist inside Russia. This 
would create a real sense of unity, rather than an authoritarian presence demanding a 
sense of unity. Putin has just created an identity for them, resulting in something that is 
artificial and simply dishonest about who the Russian identity encapsulates. The Russian 
community needs to find a real identity on their own terms, rather than by the archetype 
that the government wants them to conform to. Not only will this result in the satisfaction 
of finding an identity that properly represents every individual who makes up Russia one 




Populace power has been utilized by Putin in order to funnel his own agenda which is 
being perceived as the necessary route for the country in its entirety. If the people are to 
claim their autonomous power, then Putin would have to readjust his political doings. 
This would result either in him losing a significant grasp of his centralized power, or 
turning into a more traditional authoritarian, creating a dramatic reaction from both inside 
and outside of the country.  
 This reaction has already begun to take place in Russia. Over the course of the 
21st century Russian people have slowly realized that it is not necessary to have 
government approval if you want something changed in society. An essential part of 
human rights is this concept of the individual and the voice he or she has. This voice is 
supposed to be utilized to make an impact on the world around them. “Unlike the rallies 
in Nemtsov’s memory or even the 2011-2012 protests, this one [in 2017] did not have a 
permit from the Moscow city authorities. Over the weekend, the mayor’s office warned 
people that protestors alone would bear the responsibility for any consequences of 
attending what they deemed an illegal demonstration.”116 But still people acted upon their 
desires and protested for what they deemed to be right. To act on their desires, rather than 
waiting for the approval of an authoritarian presence shows that the Russian people are 
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